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Recent Cases
CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-
DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT OF MINORITY-GROUP
EMPLOYEE FOR EXCESSIVE WAGE GARNISHMENT
Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America'
Defendant corporation employed plaintiff, a black man, as a ware-
houseman. Several times during his employment, plaintiff's wages were
garnished to satisfy judgments. Defendant had a company rule stating,
"Conduct your personal finances in such a way that garnishments will
not be made on your wages," 2 and a policy of discharging employees whose
wages were garnished in contravention of this rule. Pursuant to that policy,
defendant dismissed plaintiff for violating the company rule. Plaintiff
filed an action alleging that the practice causing his dismissal constituted
discrimination against him because of race and, hence, violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 703 of Title VII provides:
a. It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
1. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.3
Plaintiff contended that the company rule, coupled with defendant's
policy of discharging an employee whose wages had been garnished, violated
the employment provisions of Title VII. He conceded that the defendant
had never engaged in any racial discrimination in its hiring practices.
Further, plaintiff conceded that defendant never intended its policy of
dismissal for violation of the rule to be racially discriminatory. Rather,
he asserted that discriminatory consequences resulted from his dismissal
for continued garnishment of his wages and that these consequences violated
Title VII.
Thus, the issue was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits an employer covered by the Act4 from discharging a black
person solely because his wages repeatedly have been garnished to satisfy
judgments. The District Court for Central California found for the plain-
1. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
2. Id. at 492.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1970).
4. Id. § 2000e (b), as amended 86 Stat. 103 (1972), reads:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
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tiff,5 holding that Title VII applied to this case and citing the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.6 as providing the test.
In Griggs, black employees challenged their employer's requiring
either a high school diploma or a passing score on specified intelligence
tests as a condition to initial employment in or transfer between certain
jobs. They contended that these practices violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Court held that the employment practice did
operate to discriminate against Negroes and that it was proscribed by
the 1964 Act. In so holding, the Court set out a two-pronged test for
determining whether a practice violates Title VII. The first question is
whether a particular practice discriminates on impermissible grounds as
set forth by the Act. The second inquiry asks whether the practice is
"demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance," 7 although this
standard is couched further in "business necessity"S language.
However, the Court also looked at the policy behind the passage of
the Act and said,
Discriminatory preference for any one group, minority, or majority,
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is re-
quired by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermis-
sible classification. 9
This language seems to apply the proscription of the Act to those practices
of employment that prefer one group over another or those that discrimi-
nate "invidiously" based on impermissible grounds.
The district court in Johnson applied its interpretation of the Griggs
two-pronged test 10 without reference to the above language. In so doing,
the court created a situation in which the company, if it continues its
policy of dismissal for wage garnishment, may violate Title VII in another
manner. The court's reasoning why the company's practice was discrimina-
tory against blacks, and thus violative of Title VII, is as follows: Dis-
proportionately more blacks than whites are poor; poor people have a
substantially higher rate of garnishment than the rest of the public; there-
fore, dismissal for wage garnishment subjects a disproportionate number
of blacks to dismissal." From this it follows that Title VII, while pro-
hibiting dismissal of a black employee for being garnished repeatedly,
allows an employer to dismiss a white employee whose wages are sub-
5. The parties submitted a stipulation to the court for its approval for
udgment against defendant. The court upheld this stipulation after examining
the issues as if the parties had argued the matter adversely. Johnson v. Pike Corp.
of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (opinion by Chief Justice Burger).
7. Id. at 436.
8. Id. at 431.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. A threshold question is whether the Griggs test is applicable to the situa-
tion in Johnson. The approach from Griggs seems particularly appropriate for
application in Johnson, for in both cases the inquiries were to be applied to an
employment practice racially neutral on its face and unintentionally discrimina-
tory.11. 332 F. Supp. at 494-95.
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jected to repeated garnishments. However, for an employer to dismiss
only white employees would create a preference for poor blacks over poor
whites. Such a preference appears to fall within the proscription of Title
VII as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Griggs.12 Furthermore, by
failing to recognize the "preference" language as applying to the situation
that the decision itself creates, the district court arguably created a "benign
discrimination," which may violate due process by discriminating against
the majority and showing a preference to a minority.13
Aside from this unresolved question regarding the impact of the
"preference" language in Griggs, the district court applied the Griggs two-
pronged test in a questionable manner. The first inquiry is whether the
practice discriminates against any person or group on the basis of race. 14
In Griggs, the Court made it clear that "[tihe Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrimina-
tory in operation."' 5 Therefore, the actual consequences of an employment
practice constitute the touchstone, making it unnecessary to prove either
motive or intent to discriminate16 if it is found that the consequence of
a particular practice is to discriminate against a person "because of [his]
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.... .,17
Griggs contains some troublesome language regarding this inquiry,
however. Griggs dealt with an employment practice that had existed prior
to the 1964 Act and that had been instituted with conscious discriminatory
purpose to prevent Negro workers from advancing. In light of this, the
Court interpreted the congressional intent in passing Title VII to be
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.'s
On the other hand, the district court in Johnson was dealing with a situa-
tion where the alleged discrimination was not a carryover from prior
12. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
13. See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-
The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 363, 381-83 (1966). The
court in Johnson ignores the possibility of "benign discrimination," for it says,
"The fact that [dismissal for garnishment] may also discriminate against the poor
white is irrelevant to our consideration under Title VII." 332 F. Supp. at 495.
That dismissal for wage garnishment discriminates against poor whites as well
as poor blacks is quite relevant to the "benign discrimination" question. By its
decision in Johnson, the court in effect allows the employer to continue dis-
criminating against whites on the basis of economic status while forbidding him
to do so with regard to blacks.
14. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
15. Id.
16. This follows from the Griggs opinion, which reversed a lower court hold-
ing that the practice challenged in Griggs was not proscribed by Title VII because
of a lack of discriminatory intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225(4th Cir. 1970). It is from the Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs that the test
of discriminatory consequences, regardless of intent, emerges.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1970).
18. 401 U.S. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
1972.]
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conscious discrimination. Although it is unsettled whether Title VII re-
quired a showing of present discriminatory intent where the employer
has no history of conscious discriminatory practice, the Johnson court
concluded that the employer's lack of intent to discriminate was irrelevant
under the Griggs test.' 9
The court in Johnson also dealt with the second inquiry of the Griggs
analysis in a questionable manner. The court repeated the Griggs require-
ment that the practice in question must "bear a 'demonstrable relationship'
to successful performance of the job"20 and further referred to the Griggs
"business necessity" language. 2 ' The Court in Griggs was considering in-
telligence testing scores and academic achievement required for job place-
ment or promotion. That situation appears to be quite different from the
one in Johnson, which concerned conduct of an individual that might
adversely affect the efficient operation of a business. The Fifth Circuit's
test in Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States,22 which requires
that the policy or practice be "essential to the safe and efficient operation
of [the business],"23 would appear to be more suitable to Johnson. Such
a test takes into consideration the impact of the individual's conduct on
the running of the business as a whole, rather than merely asking whether
the practice of the employer is necessary to insure good job performance by
the employee.
However, the district court failed to explain why the second inquiry
in Griggs should be applied literally and exclusively to practices of em-
ployers that vary considerably from the one in Griggs. It merely detected
an "intent" of the Supreme Court for the Griggs definition to be exclu-
sive. The judge concluded that, unless the employer can show a relation
to successful job performance, the expense and inconvenience to the em-
ployer are irrelevant.24
Currently wage garnishment is the object of much attention. Some
steps have been taken to protect debtors by prohibiting certain practices
by employers and creditors. The Supreme Court recently invalidated
prejudgment garnishment of wages as a violation of due process. 25 Congress
has enacted legislation putting limited restrictions on dismissal of em-
ployees for wage garnishment. Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act prohibits an employer from dismissing any employee for a garnish-
ment on any single indebtedness.206 Commentators have noted that limita-
tions on wage garnishment must be carefully balanced so as to protect
adequately not only the debtor-employee, but also the creditor and the
19. 332 F. Supp. at 494.
20. Id. at 493.
21. Id. at 495.
22. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). For other cases dealing with "business
necessity," see United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969), and Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. 416 F.2d at 989.
24. 332 F. Supp. at 495.
25. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in Atkinson,
Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages-A Violation of Due Process?, 35 Mo. L.
REv. 405 (1970).
26. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1970).
[Vol. 37
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employers, who all have a financial and commercial stake in the wages
or services involved.27 It is submitted that this balancing should be done
by the legislature, rather than by the courts by way of an extremely expan-
sive reading of the provisions of Title VII.
DAVID H. JETER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE RETURN
OF FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
ON ACQUITTAL
Eddy v. Moorel
The Seattle police arrested and charged Harriet Eddy with assault
and had her fingerprinted and photographed for the police files. The
charges against her were dismissed at trial. Mrs. Eddy requested the return
of her fingerprints and photographs from the police files, but the Chief
of Police denied her request. On February 25, 1970, Mrs. Eddy obtained
an ex parte order directing the Chief of Police to appear and show cause
why a writ of mandamus should not be issued ordering him to return her
fingerprints and photographs.2 Without taking any testimony, the Su-
perior Court of King County, Washington, refused to issue the writ and
held she had no legal right to their return.3
On appeal, Mrs. Eddy contended that the trial court had failed to
recognize her right of privacy in her fingerprints and photographs and
that the police had violated this right by failing to return them upon her
acquittal.4 The Court of Appeals of Washington held the right of the
individual to the return of fingerprints and photographs upon acquittal is
a fundamental one implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.5 Therefore,
the state is required to make a compelling showing of necessity in order
to justify their retention.6 Because the Chief of Police offered no evidence
to justify the retention of the fingerprints and photographs, they were
ordered returned to Mrs. Eddy.7 In addition, the court held the Washing-
27. See Cocanower, Federal Restriction of Wage Garnishments: Title III of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 44 IND. L.J. 267 (1969), and Hawkland, Fed-
eral Restrictions on Garnishments of Earnings: Herein of Title 11. of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 75 CoM. L.J. 213 (1970).
1. 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at __, 487 P.2d at 212.
5. Id. at , 487 P.2d at 217.
6. Id.
7. Id. at , 487 P.2d at 218. The record on appeal consisted of an
agreed statement of facts that contained no findings of fact. There was no factualjustification offered for the retention of the fingerprints and photographs, nor was
there any evidence offered to indicate the ability of the police department to
keep is files and records confidential.
1972]
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ton statutes, which authorize fingerprinting and photographing without
providing for their return on acquittal when the state fails to show a
compelling need for their retention, were constitutionally defective.8
Historically, the courts have generally denied any right of a person to
return or destruction of fingerprints and photographs after his acquittal,
discharge, or dismissal. 9 Some courts have held that only the legislature
can compel the return of fingerprints and photographs,o while other
courts have held that, in the absence of a statute directing their return,
the discretion to return them lies with the police and the courts should
not interfere with that discretion."l However, police have been prevented
from placing an acquitted person's photograph in a "rogue's gallery."' 2
And, recently, some federal courts have shown a tendency to expunge arrest
records and return fingerprints and photographs when an accused person
is found to be innocent.13
8. Id.
9. See Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 24 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696(1962); Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265 (Del. Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 259 A.2d 663(Del. 1969); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969), afrd, 234 So.
2d 108 (Fla. 1970); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 Il. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957);
Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947); State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), aff'd, 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914(1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834 (1948); Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq.
9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944); In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (Ct. App. 1904);
Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Hodgeman v. Olsen,
86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
10. See Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr 696(1962); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969), aff'd, 234 So. 2d
8 (Fla. 1970); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 111. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957);
In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (Ct. App. 1904); Note, The Right of
Persons Who Have Been Discharged or Acquitted of Criminal Charges to Compel
the Return of Fingerprints, Photographs, and Other Police Records, 27 Txiz.
L.Q. 441, 444 (1954).
11. Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265 (Del. Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 259 A.2d 663(Del. 1969); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947); State ex rel.
Bruns v. Clausmier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 541 (1900); Fernicola v. Keenan, 136
N.J. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944); Note, supra note 10, at 446.
12. State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), afr'd,
225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834 (1948); Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704,
42 So. 227 (1906). Cf. Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (Ct. App. 1909);
State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941); Fernicola v.
Keenan, 136 N.J. Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944).
13. See United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (arrests and
convictions ordered expunged because the arrests and convictions violated peti-
tioner's voting rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. section 1971 (b)(1970)); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated, 401
U.S. 987 (1971) (expunction ordered because of plaintiff's youth, innocence of any
crime, police misbehavior in arresting without probable cause, and the absence
of any benefit to society. However, The Supreme Court vacated the order and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971)); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (arrest records
ordered expunged or destroyed because mass arrests were due to police harass-
ment and without legal justification); United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968(D.P.R. 1967) (destruction of criminal identification records ordered because
no public good accomplished by their retention when accused person acquitted
or discharged); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (court
[Vol. 37
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In 'Eddy, the court initially discussed the equitable right of privacy
in fingerprints and photographs, but refused to use this as a basis for its
decision. The equitable or common law right of privacy in fingerprints is
a doctrine separate from the constitutional right of privacy. Conceptually,
it calls for balancing the individual's right of privacy against the public
interest in crime prevention. Although the court might have relied on
such a theory, it felt that reliance on an equitable right of privacy would
grant too much discretion to the police in determining what records are
needed for effective law enforcement. 14
The Eddy court appears to have applied a substantive due process
analysis in reaching its decision. It analyzed the case by first determining
whether there is a constitutional right of privacy in fingerprints and photo-
graphs that is immune from state government infringement under the
fourteenth amendment. The court stated that the independent existence
of a constitutional right to privacy was recognized in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,'5 which struck down a Connecticut law forbidding the dissemi-
nation of birth control information because it violated the right of marital
privacy. In that decision the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas, held that the marriage relationship is within the zone of privacy
created by fundamental constitutional guarantees under the Bill of
Rights.' 6 However, Griswold provides only limited support for the propo-
sition that a constitutional right of privacy exists in fingerprints and
photographs. The marital relationship is as old and as fundamental as
civilization itself,'7 and the Supreme Court has characterized it as a
"realm of family life which the state cannot enter without substantial
justification."' 8 In contrast, fingerprinting and photographing are not
traditionally regarded as private in nature,' 9 and courts have recognized
the validity of such procedures for identification purposes, even though
they involve minor interferences with persons charged with crimes.2 0
Moreover, the government has a substantial interest in taking and retaining
fingerprints and photographs as an aid in the prevention of crime. There-
refused to reconsider a previous order expunging Kowall's arrest record); Irani v.
United States, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1971) (error to deny relief
outright where arrested person makes factual showing negating guilt).
14. 5 Wash. App. at _ , 487 P.2d at 214.
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Id. at 485. In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg said
the ninth amendment recognizes fundamental rights such as this one which, though
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, are protected from abridgement
by the government. The Chief justice and Mr. Justice Brennan concurred with
him. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White also wrote separate concurring
opinions holding the right of marital privacy is one of the fundamental unenumer-
ated rights protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (concurring opinion).
18. Id. at 502, quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
19. United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); United States v. Laub
Baking Co., 283 F. Supp. 217, 227 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d
265, 267 (Del. Ch.), aff'd per curiam, 259 A.2d 663 (Del. 1969); Purdy v. Mulkey,
228 So. 2d 132, 137 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969), aff'd, 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970).
20. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Rigney v. Hendrick, 355
F.2d 710 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966); Kennedy v. United
States, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 873 (1964).
1972.]
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fore, Griswold would seem to provide only a limited basis for finding an
analogous constitutional right of privacy in the return of fingerprints
and photographs.
To strengthen its position, the court in Eddy pointed out that, prior
to Griswold, the Supreme Court had recognized constitutional rights closely
related to the right of privacy.2 1 The court also cited Menard v. Mitchell22
and United States v. Kalish23 as expanding the scope of rights considered
to be fundamental. 24 Although both cases involved situations similar to
that in Eddy and lend some support to the notion of an expanding right
of privacy, both fall short of holding that there is a constitutional right
to privacy requiring the return of fingerprints and photographs on acquit-
tal. However, they support the result in Eddy insofar as they indicate that
some type of relief should be available to an acquitted person-the
fingerprints and photographs of Kalish were ordered returned while the
dissemination of Menard's was limited. After discussing these cases, the
Eddy court concluded that a constitutional right of privacy in fingerprints
and photographs does exist.25
In reaching this holding, the court characterized the right of privacy
in the return of fingerprints and photographs upon acquittal as a "funda-
mental" right within the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 28 Gen-
erally, a constitutional right that is not characterized as "fundamental"
21. 5 Wash. App. at , 487 P.2d at 215. The court quotes Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) which describes the fourth and fifth amendments
as protecting a man's home and the privacies of his life against government
invasion. In Griswold, Justice Douglas listed the following zones of privacy: The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the first amendment; the third
amendment prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time
of peace without the consent of the owner; the fourth amendment affirmation
of the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures; the fifth amendment self-incrimina-
tion clause, which enables a citizen to create a zone of privacy that government
may not force him to surrender to his detriment; and the ninth amendment,
which provides, "[T]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
22. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), on remand 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
Menard was arrested on suspicion of burglary but was subsequently freed for
lack of evidence to connect him with any crime. Under California law, the police
forwarded his arrest record and fingerprints to the F.B.I. Menard sued to have
his record expunged from the F.B.I. files. The court of appeals held it was with-
out authority to expunge the record, because the legality of the arrest should
be determined in the first instance after his administrative remedies had been
exhausted. The court of appeals limited the dissemination of his arrest record
to law enforcement agencies and agencies of the federal government. On remand,
the district court also limited dissemination while denying expungement.
23. 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967). Kalish was arrested for failure to report
for induction and was fingerprinted and photographed. The arrest occurred
despite the fact he had voluntarily surrendered to the jurisdiction and indicated
his willingness to be inducted. The charges were never prosecuted, and Kalish
sought an order to expunge the fingerprints and photographs, which was granted.
24. 5 Wash. App. at - 487 P.2d at 215.
25. Id. at _ , 487 P.2d at 217-8.
26. Id. at , 487 P.2d at 217.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 881 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (concurring opinion),
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in describing fundamental rights, said the Court should
[Vol. 37
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may be regulated by the state if the regulation is reasonably and rationally
related to a valid state purpose.27 On the other hand, rights characterized
as "fundamental" may be abridged by the state only upon a showing that
the abridgement serves a compelling state interest.28 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court, in a series of decisions, has held that the fourteenth amend-
ment only absorbs and applies to the states those specifics of the first eight
amendments which express "fundamental" rights.29 Therefore, the court's
classification of the right of privacy in the return of fingerprints and
photographs as a "fundamental" right was crucial, because otherwise the
state would not have to demonstrate a compelling need to retain finger-
prints and photographs of an acquitted person.
The retention of fingerprints and photographs of an acquitted person
may be characterized as an unwarranted government invasion that de-
prives him of life and liberty without due process of law in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. Retention of fingerprints and photographs
by the state may have an adverse effect on the acquitted individual. The
Eddy court recognized a direct relation between the loss of individual
privacy and the retention of arrest records.30 Such records may haunt an
individual for life and create a stigma that can directly bear on the
functions which that person can perform.31 Opportunities for schooling,
employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or lost as a conse-
quence of the arrest, even if it is followed by acquittal or complete
exoneration from the charges involved.3 2 Even when no direct economic
loss is involved, there may be substantial injury to the person's reputa-
tion.33 This sort of injury continues as long as the criminal identification
records are retained.3 4 Furthermore, the bases for the value of the arrest
record as an investigative aid are the assumption the person committed the
crime and the likelihood he will commit subsequent crimes.3 5 If the person
examine the traditions and conscience of the people to determine whether a
principle is so rooted there as to be ranked as fundamental.
27. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Railway Expressway v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
28. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (interstate movement
said to be a fundamental right); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500(1964) (freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960) ("[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."); Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is compelling.").
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (concurring opinion).
30. 5 Wash. App. at , 487 P.2d at 216. This relation was noted in
United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
31. Note, Criminal Law-Constitutional Law-The F.B.I's Right to Retain
and Disseminate Arrest Records of Persons Not Convicted of a Crime May Be
Limited by the First and Fifth Amendments, 46 NoTmE DAmE LAw. 825, 829 (1971).
32. Menard v. Mitchell, 480 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970), on remand 328
F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
33. Id.; Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
34. United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R. 1967).
35. 5 Wash. App. at __, 487 P.2d at 217; Note, Constitutional Law-Right
of Police to Retain Arrest Records, 49 N.C.L.R. 509, 517 (1971).
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did not commit the crime, this assumption is invalid, and the record's use-
fulness to police investigations will be negligible.386 Also, there is a pre-
sumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty, and an acquitted
person should be entitled to this presumption by the fact of his acquittal.
Therefore, there may be a constitutional limit beyond which the govern-
ment may not tread in devising classifications that lump the innocent
with the guilty.3 7
On the other hand, any right of privacy an individual has in the
return of fingerprints and photographs must be weighed against the public
interest in crime prevention. First, broad discretion in this area enables
trained personnel to best utilize facilities for combatting crime.38 Finger-
prints and photographs are vital to an investigation when a person dis-
appears or becomes a fugitive from justice.3 0 An accurate identification
system, faithfully administered, may be of assistance not only in finding the
guilty criminal, but also may aid in clearing an innocent suspect.4 0
Moreover, these files are needed to keep abreast of the tremendous upsurge
of criminal activity and the increased mobility of society.4 1 These arrest
and identification records may be a vital force in curbing the growth of
organized crime.42 Finally, some persons may be deterred from future
crimes due to the increased likelihood of detection created by the reten-
tion of photographs and fingerprints. 43
A critical question in this analysis is why the case was dismissed or
the person acquitted. If the charges are dropped because the wrong person
was arrested, he should be entitled to the return of his fingerprints and
photographs.4 4 Similarly, an acquitted person may argue that under our
system of justice a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and
that because he was not found guilty at trial, this presumption entitles
him to the return of his fingerprints and photographs. However, it be-
comes a closer question when the charges are dropped because of insuf-
ficient evidence or the charges are dismissed at the prosecutor's discretion.
Even though the person is guilty of some crime, the prosecutor may refuse
to prosecute because he feels there is a lack of evidence to convict. In
these situations, the nature of the crime may be considered because the
public interest is greater when a serious crime is involved. Also, if the
person has a history as a troublemaker or of conviction of crimes that tend
to follow a pattern, such as sex crimes, it would be more reasonable to
36. Note, supra note 35, at 517.
37. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970), on remand 328
F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), quoting from Boorda v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 421 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Oir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970).
38. Hoover, Law Enforcement States Its Views, 12 VILL. L. REv. 457 (1967).
39. See State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmier, 154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 541 (1900);
In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (Ct. App. 1904).
40. Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 47, 75 N.E.2d 548, 551 (1947).
41. Note, supra note 31, at 828.
42. Id.
43. Everett, New Procedures of Scientific Investigation and the Protection of
the Accused's Rights, 1959 DuoK L.J. 32, 47 (1959).
44. State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 433, 153 S.W.2d 834, 837 (1941).
Dicta in this case recognizes the right of innocent persons to the return of records
and exhibits in a proper case.
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retain the records. In other words, even though a person is presumed inno-
cent, there are valid reasons to retain fingerprints and photographs, and
when such reasons are present, the courts may be more likely to find the
state interest to be dominant.
The nature of tiie relief sought may also influence the court's decision.
The court should be willing to limit dissemination of fingerprints and
photographs because of the increased possibility of harm which may come
from improper dissemination. However, at least one court has considered
the ability of the police to keep fingerprints confidential to be low because
of the increasing availability of fingerprints, technological developments,
and the enormous increase in population.45 At the very least, law enforce-
ment agencies should be required to keep records confidential in order
to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands and causing needless
harm. A stronger showing of possible injury may be required when a
person requests the return of fingerprints and photographs. Although there
is less likelihood of harm when an agency merely retains the fingerprints
and photographs than when it disseminates them, inability of the police
to keep them confidential should weigh heavily in favor of their return.
This apparently was one of the factors which influenced the Eddy court
to compel the return of the fingerprints and photographs, because the
court emphasized that the police made no showing of their ability to keep
the fingerprints and photographs confidential. 46
In a proper case, the court might order the return of the photographs
while allowing retention of the fingerprints, because the publicity and
the danger of mistaken identity which might result from the improper
dissemination of a photograph make the photograph a likelier source of
serious injury than a set of fingerprints. But the courts will probably be
most reluctant to grant expungement of the arrest record, because once
an arrest occurs it becomes a fact which no one can change whether it was
right or wrong.47 However, the courts may still consider the ability of
the police to keep the record confidential, because the improper disclosure
of an arrest record could easily result in harm from unfavorable publicity.
In such instances, expungement of arrest records will probably be limited
to extreme cases with unusual facts which dearly indicate that such relief
is desirable.
The result that the balancing of these competing interests will produce
in any given case depends heavily upon which right of privacy doctrine
the court adopts. The constitutional right of privacy doctrine adopted in
Eddy will more frequently entitle an acquitted person to the return of his
fingerprints and photographs, because it shifts the burden to the state to
show a compelling need for the retention of fingerprints and photographs.
However, the court does not discuss what constitutes a showing of com-
pelling need by the state. Ultimately, the frequency with which relief will be
granted depends on whether the courts will adhere strictly to the compelling
need standard. In contrast, the equitable right of privacy doctrine would
45. See Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 727 (D.D.C. 1971), on remandfrom 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
46. 5 Wash. App. at _; 487 P.2 at 217.
47. Note, supra note 35, at 515.
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favor the retention of fingerprints and photographs of an acquitted per-
son. Under such a theory, the burden is on the acquitted person to show
that his right of privacy in his fingerprints and photographs outweighs the
state interest in crime prevention.
Several other theories could have been used to strengthen the holding
in Eddy. The fourth amendment zone of privacy, which protects the in-
dividual's right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 48 may extend to protect an
individual's right of privacy in his fingerprints and photographs. The
Supreme Court has said that, even though the fourth amendment cannot
be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy, it protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.49 The
Court has also noted the fourth amendment was meant to prevent whole-
sale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry.50 It may well
be that the government's retention of an acquitted person's fingerprints
and photographs amounts to an intrusion into his privacy and personal
security, because such records imply criminality on the part of a person
adjudged not guilty of any crime.51 Therefore, because the fourth amend-
ment functions to protect against government intrusions, it should extend
to protect an acquitted person's right to the return of fingerprints and
photographs. In Davis v. Mississippi,5 2 the Supreme Court said that finger-
print evidence is subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment.53
The majority opinion contained dicta indicating that authorization of a
judicial officer must be obtained in advance for fingerprinting.54 How-
ever, Davis was an unusual case due to the illegal detention and police
action in connection with obtaining the fingerprints.
The best circumstances for protection under the fourth amendment
arise when a person arrested without probable cause has been fingerprinted
and photographed. The exclusionary rule, which bars from trial the
physical materials obtained as a direct result of an unlawful invasion, 55
might also be applied by analogy to facts similar to those in Eddy.56 It
seems only reasonable to require the police to return the fingerprints
and photographs obtained by the unlawful invasion, because this would
put the person in the same position as before the illegal arrest.57
However, merely because there is probable cause for an arrest, it does
48. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 847, 350 (1967).
50. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).
51. See Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), on remand from
430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R.
1967).
52. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
53. Id. at 723-27.
54. Id. at 728. Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate concurring opinion, objects
to this statement.
55. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
56. See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970), on remand 328
F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971). The court questioned "whether the Constitution
can tolerate the adverse use of information or tangible objects as the result of
an unconstitutional arrest of the individual concerned." 430 F.2d at 491.
57. Note, supra note 35, at 511.
[Vol. 37
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/8
RECENT CASES
not follow that the acquitted person should be denied relief.5 s If com-
plete exoneration results (i.e., the police concede the wrong person was
arrested due to their mistake), the individual should be entitled to the
same fourth amendment protection as the illegally arrested person. Also,
if a person is found to be innocent of any crime, it should make no differ-
ence whether the arrest was illegal or legal. It would present an anomalous
situation if an innocent person could not obtain the return of his finger-
prints and photographs because his arrest was legal, while a guilty person
could obtain their return merely because his arrest was illegal. Because
the police are under a constitutional obligation to act responsibly when
making an arrest, they should also be under an obligation to restore all
persons to their position of privacy before the arrest by returning finger-
prints and photographs. 59 Thus, while the acquitted person who has been
legally arrested arguably poses a more difficult problem, he should have
the same protection under the fourth amendment as the illegally or errone-
ously arrested person. Therefore, after a person has been acquitted,
discharged, or dismissed, regardless of the reason, the retention of his
fingerprints is an unreasonable government intrusion in his right to be
secure in his person.6 0 Since the fourth amendment functions to protect
one's personal security, it should require the return of fingerprints and
photographs in such instances.
The fifth amendment also provides support for a right of privacy
in fingerprints and photographs. The self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment creates a zone of privacy that prevents a person from
being compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. Arguably,
this privacy zone may be violated by the retention of fingerprints and
photographs after acquittal, because they imply that the person has a
criminal record when he has committed no crime. Therefore, the fifth
amendment might be invoked to prevent this implication of criminality.
However, this is a limited argument because the Supreme Court has yet
to hold physical evidence such as fingerprints and photographs as self-
incriminating within the meaning of the fifth amendment privilege.61
The Washington Court of Appeals has provided a constitutional
doctrine for the return of fingerprints and photographs on the theory
58. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 724 (D.D.C. 1971), on remand from
430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Note, supra note 35. The court in Menard stated
that because the presence or absence of probable cause in an arrest proves nothing
about the actual conduct of a person, an analysis premised on this standard has
little value. An arrest with probable cause may result in acquittal, while an
arrest without probable cause may lead to a conviction. Only a conviction carries
legal significance as to a person's involvement in criminal behavior, under our
system of criminal justice.
59. Note, supra note 35, at 511-12.
60. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
61. In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), the court said the fifth
amendment prohibited the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort com-
munications from a person, but did not exclude his body as evidence when it
is material. In Schmerber v. California, 884 U.S. 757, 761 (1966), the Supreme
Court held the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination only protects
an accused from being compelled to testify against himself or otherwise provide
the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Later, in United
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that the right of privacy in them is a fundamental one protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. If other courts accept
this doctrine, it will be a significant milestone in a person's right to the
return of his fingerprints and photographs. Although the court will con-
tinue to balance the individual's rights against the public interest, the
burden has been placed on the state to show a compelling need for the
retention of fingerprints and photographs. Therefore, it should be more
difficult for the state to make such a showing, which will result in a more
frequent return of fingerprints and photographs on acquittal. However,
whether other courts will impose this burden upon the state will depend
upon their willingness to find the right of privacy in fingerprints and
photographs a fundamental one.
KENNETH 0. MCCUTCHEON
INCOME TAXATION-DEPENDENCY EXEMPTIONS
FOR CHILDREN OF DIVORCED OR SEPARATED PARENTS
Allen F. LaBayl
Petitioner Allen F. LaBay was the father of two children by a marriage
that ended in divorce. The divorce decree provided that the mother was
to have custody of the children and receive child support payments from
the father. Pursuant to this decree, LaBay in 1967 paid child support total-
ling $1,820. On his 1967 federal income tax return, he claimed dependency
exemptions for the two children. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
disallowed these exemptions and asserted a deficiency.
Although not a party to the action, the mother, an employee of the
Internal Revenue Service, testified at the trial as to the amount of total
support for the children. The mother produced cancelled checks to sub-
stantiate most of the items of support, but provided only unsubstantiated
estimates for some support items. As to the checks which she did produce,
States v. Wade, 888 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court reaffirmed the holding in Schmerber
and said placing defendant in a line-up did not violate his privilege against self-
incrimination.
Note, supra note 35, at 515, suggests that the first amendment protects the
right of privacy in the return of fingerprints and photographs of an acquitted
person. It points out that the Supreme Court pays close attention to laws that
exert a chilling effect on first amendment rights. The argument is that persons
stating viewpoints or participating in associations which the police consider suspect
may be subject to closer police scrutiny. The person's reaction to this enhanced
visibility can act to inhibit the vigorous exercise of first amendment rights. Con-
sequently, retention of the records of political arrests undermine a crucial con-
stitutional prerogative. The arrest record causes apprehension from increased fear
of police scrutiny, and the only way to avoid this is to return the fingerprints
and photographs and perhaps expunge the record. However, the chilling effects
doctrine is more important in cases of arrest that result from activities within the
realm of the first amendment. It is unlikely that it will be applied outside this
limited area.
1. 55 T.C. 6 (1970), af'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1971).
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she had difficulty identifying certain checks as representing specific ex-
penditures for a particular child. In addition, there were apparent discrep-
ancies between her testimony at trial and certain documents submitted
by her before trial. She explained these discrepancies by stating that she
made a more thorough investigation during the time between the date
she submitted the documents and the date of her trial testimony.
The Tax Court found this testimony adequate to establish total sup-
port of $4,483, which was more than twice the amount contributed by
petitioner, and therefore concluded that he was not entitled to the exemp-
tion deductions.
For tax years prior to 1966, the normal dependency rules of section
152 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19542 were applied to determine
who was entitled to the dependency exemption for a child of divorced
or legally separated parents. That section provides that the term "de-
pendent" includes a child over half of whose support was received from
the taxpayer. Thus, the dependency exemption was granted to the parent
who provided over half the total support of the child. This "greater than
one-half" rule made it difficult for a parent not having custody to prove
the right to an exemption. Because a determination by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue disallowing an exemption is presumptively correct,3
the burden of establishing the right to such exemption is on the taxpayer.4
To meet this burden, the taxpayer was forced, because of the "greater than
one-half" rule, to establish not only his own support contributions but,
in addition, those of all others (including those of the custodial parent) in
order to establish total support.5
Proving his own contributions was normally easy for the noncustodial
parent, and generally involved merely an arithmetic computation. Proving
the contributions of the custodial parent, however, in order to arrive at
total support, was another matter. The noncustodial parent faced con-
siderable difficulty in that portion of his proof, for several reasons. Because
of the animosity that normally accompanies a divorce, the custodial parent,
who is generally the only person who can provide information as to total
support, was often reluctant to do so, and was sometimes conveniently
forgetful as a witness. 6 In addition, the Internal Revenue Service is pro-
hibited from disclosing to one spouse information supplied by the other.7
As a result, the noncustodial parent generally had a right to a de-
2. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended.
3. Rose D. Seraydar, 50 T.C. 756, 761 (1968); Robert I. Brown, 48 T.C. 42,
43 (1967).
4. E.R. Cobb, Sr., 28 T.C. 595, 597 (1957); Sid Dyer, 14 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 642, 645, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 536, 538 (1955).
5. Rose D. Seraydar, 50 T.C. 756, 760 (1968); Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547,
549 (1961); Raymond Wilson, Jr., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1540, 1541, 30 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 1683, 1684 (1961); Bernard C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935, 938 (1960); James
H. Fitzner, 31 T.C. 1252, 1254 (1959).
6. Robert I. Brown, 48 T.C. 42, 43 (1967); James E. Stafford, 46 T.C. 515,
518 (1966); Lagomarcino, The Divorced Husband and the Dependency Exemp-
tion Mirage: An Outline of the Problem and of a Statutory Corrective Procedure,
12 TAx L. REv. 85, 93 (1956).
7. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7213 (a); Rev. Rul. 120, 1958-1 Cum. Buur. 498.
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pendency exemption in theory only s and was rarely successful in court.9
In spite of this limited success, however, noncustodial parents frequently
raised the issue and thereby imposed a considerable administrative burden
on the Internal Revenue Service. 10
In an attempt to alleviate these problems, section 152 (e), which deals
exclusively with the dependency exemption for children of divorced or
legally separated parents, was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1967.
The new section creates a set of shifting presumptions which, in most
cases, allows resolution of the dependency exemption issue at the time
of the divorce or separation.
There are three general requirements for application of section
152 (e). First, the parents of the child must be divorced or legally separated
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or separated under a
written separation agreement. Second, the child must receive over half his
support from one or both parents. Third, one or both parents must have
custody of the child for more than half the year."
If the above requirements are met, the section provides as a general
rule that the parent with custody for the greater part of the year is entitled
to the exemption. To this general rule there are two exceptions. First, the
noncustodial parent (the parent having custody for the shorter period
of time during the year) may claim the exemption if it is so provided in
the divorce decree or separation agreement and the noncustodial parent
provides at least $600 toward the support of each child. Thus, if the
noncustodial parent fails to provide at least $600 for support of each child
he will lose the exemption, even though it is expressly given to him in the
decree or agreement. The second exception provides that the noncustodial
parent may receive the exemption if he provides at least $1,200 in child
support (regardless of the number of children), unless the custodial parent
(usually the mother) can clearly establish that she provided more than the
noncustodial parent. The noncustodial parent may invoke this presump-
tion in spite of an express provision in the divorce decree or separation
agreement giving the exemption to the custodial parent.
In LaBay, petitioner attempted to gain dependency exemptions under
the second exception to the general rule. Because the petitioner, as non-
custodial parent, provided more than $1,200 in child support, he contended
8. Lagomarcino, supra note 6, at 87.
9. Id. at 89; Sander, Dependency Exemptions for Children of Divorced or
Separated Spouses, 45 TAxIS 710, 711 (1967).
10. H.R. REP. No. 102, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); S. REP. No. 488, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
11. Even if these three requirements are met, section 152 (e) is inapplicable
in the absence of a dispute as to which parent contributed greater than one-half
of total support. In David A. Prophit, 57 T.C. No. 51 (Dec. 31, 1971), petitioner,
the noncustodial parent, had neither provided at least $600 per child nor $1,200
or more for all of them. Neither did the West German decree of divorce provide
that he should be entitled to the deductions. Thus, if section 152 (e) had been
applied, the noncustodial parent would have been denied the deduction. The
Commissioner, however, had stipulated that the petitioner had provided more
than one-half the total support of the children. The Tax Court held that because
of this stipulation section 152 (e) was inapplicable. Thus, section 152 (e) may be
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that he was entitled to the exemptions, unless it was clearly established
that the custodial parent provided more than half the children's total
support. Because the custodial parent was not a party, the burden of "dear-
ly establishing" this fact was actually on the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Petitioner claimed this burden was not met by the custodial
parent's testimony and records, based on language in both the House and
Senate Congressional Committee Reports stating that "clear and con-
vincing evidence" is required to meet the "dearly established" require-
ment.1 2 The Tax Court disagreed and held that to "dearly establish" that
the custodial parent provided more support than the noncustodial parent
requires only proof by a "clear preponderance of the evidence," and that
this burden was met by the mother's testimony. The court stated:
A "clear preponderance" of the evidence means something more
positive and explicit, as opposed to inferences to be drawn from
ambiguous and equivocal proof. In other words, it is evidence that
tends directly to establish the point to which it is adduced, instead
of leaving it a matter of conjecture or presumption.' 3
The court noted the "clear and convincing" language in the legislative
history but thought it "highly unlikely that Congress could have intended
to impose upon respondent (and indirectly upon the parent having
custody) a stringent and extraordinary burden."' 4
Although the second exception to the general rule of section 152 (e)
has been criticized,' 5 the commentators apparently foresaw no contro-
versy concerning the "dearly establish" language. Writers commenting on
section 152 (e) assumed that the "clear and convincing" standard would
be applied without challenge.1 6
The terms "preponderance of the evidence," "dear preponderance
of the evidence," "clearly establish" and "dear and convincing evidence"
are terms of imprecise meaning. The most precise is "preponderance of
the evidence," which is generally said to mean that a proposition is more
likely true than not.17 In other words, the probability of the proposition
advanced is greater than 50 percent.' 8 Thus, proof by a preponderance of
the evidence is the lowest degree of proof recognized by courts' 9 and is
the standard generally applied in civil cases.2 0
12. H.R. REP. No. 102, 90th Gong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967); S. RE. No. 488, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
13. 55 T.C. at 13.
14. Id.
15. See Glassberg, Who is a Dependent and How to Support Him Taxwise,
N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FEw. TAX 1, 19 (1968); Krawchick, Who is a Dependent?
Whose Dependent? What is Support?, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1343, 1351-
52 (1971); Nitzburg, New Law Attempts to Unravel Mess Now Existing With
Dependency Exemptions, 27 J. TAx. 258, 259 (1967); Sander, supra note 9, at 714.
16. Sander, supra note 9, at 712-13, 716.
17. United States v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 215 F. Supp. 532, 543 (D. Kan.
1963); Cook v. Michael, 214 Ore. 513, 527, 330 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1958); C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 319 (1954).
18. In re Corey, 230 Cal. App. 2d 813, 823, 41 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1964);
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9 n.2, 415 P.2d 48, 51 n.2 (1966);
C. McCoRmiCK, supra note 17.
19. Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45, 49, 70 A.2d 854, 856 (1950).
20. C. McCoiumuciK, supra note 17.
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At the other end of the spectrum in civil cases is "clear and con-
vincing evidence," which requires that the trier of fact be left with no
serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion.2 1
Absolute certainty, however, is not required,22 and "clear and convincing
evidence" requires something less than "proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"
as in criminal cases.2 3 This standard has generally been applied only in
special civic cases involving, for example, fraud and undue influence and
cases where there is a special danger of deception.24
The term "clearly establish" was used for the first time in the Internal
Revenue Code with the 1967 addition of section 152 (e).25 As yet, there
are no cases based on the Internal Revenue Code which define "clearly
establish." Outside the Code, the term is rarely defined, and conflicting
definitions are found in the decided cases. Although it has been held that
"clearly established" means without uncertainty,2 6 it has also been held
that "clearly established" does not require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.27 Thus, the term falls far short of being a recognized evidentiary
term of art, and was perhaps an unfortunate choice of wording by Congress.
Somewhere between the degree of proof required for a mere "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" and that required for "clear and convincing
evidence" is proof by a "clear preponderance of the evidence," held to be
required in LaBay. The court held that "clearly establish" in section 152 (e)
requires only proof by a "clear preponderance of the evidence" and not
"clear and convincing evidence," as contended by LaBay and (ostensibly
at least) intended by Congress.2 8 As with the term "dearly establish," the
term "clear preponderance" is also seldom used. Writers on the subject do
not mention the term,29 and cases outside the Internal Revenue Code
which speak of "clear preponderance" do so more by carelessness than by
design, in that they often define "clear" preponderance in terms which fit
the generally accepted definition of "mere" preponderance. 3° The term
"clear" preponderance is used in the Internal Revenue Code in sections
21. Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 280, 248
P.2d 692, 698 (1952); Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 41, 44,
233 P.2d 699, 700 (1951).
22. Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784 n.2 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 928 (1969); Jackman v. Lawrence Drilling & Dev. Co., 106 Kan. 59, 64,
187 P. 258, 261 (1920).
23. Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784 n.2 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969); Merrick v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 261, 110 N.E. 493, 494 (1915).
24. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17 § 320; 9 J. WIGMO E, EVIDENCE § 2498
(3rd ed. 1940).
25. 55 T.C. at 14 (dissenting opinion).
26. McEvony v. Rowland, 43 Neb. 97, 100, 61 N.W. 124, 125 (1894).
27. People v. Hamilton, 62 Cal. 377, 384 (1882).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 102, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1967); S. REP. No. 488,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
29. Both Professor McCormick and Professor Wigmore, for example, speak
only of a "preponderance of the evidence," and do not mention "clear predonder-
ance." C. McCoMncK, supra note 17; 9 J. WIGo1RE, supra note 24 § 2498.
30. See, e.g., Lutheran Church of Good Shepherd v. Canfield, 233 So. 2d 331,
341 (La. Ct. App. 1970), where the court stated:
Plaintiff must prove his case by a dear preponderance of evidence, which
means plaintiff need only show it is more probable than not that de-
fendant's negligence was the cause of the harm ...
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357 (b) and 1551 (a), both of which require the taxpayer to prove by a
clear preponderance of the evidence that his purpose in making certain
types of transactions was not tax avoidance. Cases on these two sections, how-
ever, are of little help in arriving at a definition of "dear" preponderance.
Such a definition has not been a crucial issue in any of the cases under
either section. Some courts, in dealing with section 1551 (a), have simply
defined "mere" preponderance and then added the modifying word "clear"
without definition, 31 while others have completely ignored the word "clear"
and spoken simply of a "preponderance" of the evidence.3 2 A few cases
dealing with section 1551 (a), however, have stated that "dear preponder-
ance" requires a degree of proof lying somewhere between mere pre-
ponderance and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.83 Because no settled
definition of this term has resulted from the cases under sections 357 (b)
and 1551 (a)3 4 the court in LaBay was free to conclude that "dear" pre-
ponderance means something more than a "mere" preponderance, but
less than the degree of proof required by "clear and convincing evidence."
Although this conclusion leaves much leeway, and therefore results in
less than an exact standard, it is probably as precise a standard as can be
extracted from the case, in light of the court's somewhat ambiguous defini-
tion of "clear preponderance."3 5
Although the case is unclear as to the exact standard of proof imposed
on the custodial parent, it is clear that he has a relatively lighter burden
than was generally thought applicable before the decision. Indeed, this
burden may have been lightened to the point that the real burden, in
effect, is again placed on the noncustodial parent. The custodial parent
in LaBay "clearly established," by a "clear preponderance of the evidence"
that she provided more than half the total child support with relative
ease. The court found her testimony adequate to meet the burden in
spite of: (1) Her total failure to substantiate some of her support items;
(2) her difficulty in matching specific checks with specific expenditures
for a particular child; (3) her apparent changing of the amount she claimed
for total support between the time certain pre-trial documents were pre-
pared and the date of her trial testimony. These deficiencies were especially
important, because the case turned on acceptance of her unsubstantiated
31. See, e.g., Frames, Inc. v. United States 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 94,847, 94,850
(M.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 1964); Camelot Realty Co. v. United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 75,165, 75,166 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1959); Contract Battery Mfg. Co. v. Tomlin-
son, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 68,802, 68,803 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1958).
32. See, e.g., Airport Grove Corp. v. United States, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,042,
86,044 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 1969), aff'd, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,462, 431 F.2d 739
(5th Cir. 1970); United Mortgage Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
87,308, 87,315 (N.D. Ga. July 26, 1966); LaBarge Water Well Supply Co. v. United
States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,122, 87,124 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 1962).
33. See, e.g., Melvin Asphalt Prod. Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
87,196, 87,197 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 1966).
34. Even if the § 1551 (a) or 357 (b) cases did reveal a commonly accepted
definition of "dear preponderance," it is questionable whether such a definition
would be applicable to cases dealing with § 152 (e). Sections 1551 (a) and 357 (b)
deal with the subjective intent of the taxpayer, whereas § 152 (e) deals with an
objective amount (i.e. "greater than one-half").
35. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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estimates. 86 Imposition of such a light burden on the custodial parent
renders the presumption in favor of the noncustodial parent of little value
and, in effect, places the noncustodial parent in substantially the position
he was in under the old law.
The correctness of this conclusion becomes more apparent when this
case is compared with cases decided under the old law. Although cases
involving the dependency exemption for children of divorced parents are
decided on their particular facts,3 7 a factual pattern is apparent in cases
where both parents claim the exemption. In most cases, both under the
old law and the new, the trier of fact is faced with a situation where the
noncustodial parent can easily establish his own support contributions.
In contrast, the custodial parent can seldom substantiate all her support
expenditures. Her total support figure, of necessity, includes some esti-
mates. For example, she must estimate the fair rental value of the dwelling
place allocable to the child, as well as the numerous items paid for in
cash. To compound the problem, most people have neither the time nor
the inclination to keep records detailed enough to substantiate all support
expenditures. Faced with such a situation, a court must decide whether
to believe the testimony of the custodial parent. This was true in the
present case and in cases decided under the old law.38
The difficulty with substantiation encountered by the custodial parent
appears to have been a major reason for the court's holding. The court
noted that "proof in dependency exemption cases does not lend itself to
precision or exactness,"3 0 and concluded that Congress did not intend
to place an extraordinary burden on the Internal Revenue Service. 40 Thus,
while the court was sympathetic to the plight of the custodial parent,41
it was obviously even more concerned about placing a heavy burden on
the Internal Revenue Service (which frequently has the burden of "dearly
36. 55 T.C. at 12.
37. James E. Stafford, 46 T.C. 515, 518 (1966); Lyta J. Morris, 25 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1248, 1259, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1399, 1410 (1966); E.R. Cobb, Sr.;
28 T.C. 595, 597 (1957); Sid Dyer, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 642, 644, 24 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 536, 538 (1955).
38. See, e.g., Joyce T. Haft, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 124, 39 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 144 (1970); Lyta J. Morris, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1248, 35 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1399 (1966); Edmund D. Lai, 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 477, 31 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 532 (1962); Raymond Wilson, Jr., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1540, 30 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1683 (1961); Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547 (1961); Raymond M.
McKay, 34 T.C. 1080 (1960); James R. White, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1393, 25
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1137 (1956); Sid Dyer, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 642, 24 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 536 (1955).
39. 55 T.C. at 13.
40. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
41. It should be noted that there are other possible reasons for favoring
the custodial parent with a lighter burden of proof which, though not mentioned
by the court, may have been considered. For example, the custodial parent pro-
vides a number of benefits to the child in the form of personal services, which
cannot be induded as part of the support contributions, because no expenditure
in money is made. Also, allowing the exemption to the custodial parent probably
produces more revenue. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the
noncustodial parent (generally the father) usually falls into a higher tax bracket
than the custodial parent (generally the mother).
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establishing" that the custodial parent provided more support than the
noncustodial parent).
The court may also have recognized the inherent weakness of the
second exception under section 152 (e) (2) (B) and rendered this decision
in order to limit its application. The problem with this exception is that
it allows, indeed invites, the noncustodial parent to violate his prior agree-
ment giving the dependency exemption to the custodial parent. A non-
custodial parent who is obligated under an agreement to provide child
support in an amount just under $1,200 may invoke the presumption in
his favor by increasing his support expenditures by an amount sufficient
to place him above the $1,200 minimum. Thus, a noncustodial parent by
spending, for example, an additional $100 could gain several $675 exemp-
tions, 42 because the $1,200 amount applies regardless of the number of
children. The court's decision in this case will no doubt discourage this
sort of duplistic activity by putting the noncustodial parent on notice
that he will be able to take advantage of the second exception only in
clear cases.
Assuming the correctness of the foregoing conclusions, the problem
becomes one of planning for both the custodial and noncustodial parent.
The noncustodial parent, after LaBay, has little chance of availing him-
self of the second exception by simply increasing his support expenditures
to over the $1,200 minimum. The second exception will no doubt con-
tinue to be available in clear cases. Because of the uncertainty LaBay creates,
however, he should instead take advantage of the first exception to the
general rule of section 152 (e) (contained in section 152 (e) (2) (A)). This
can be done by providing in the divorce decree. or separation agreement
that -he receives the exemption and then making certain that he provides
an amount greater than $600 for child support.
As with the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent should also
attempt to obtain the dependency exemption by the terms of the divorce
decree or separation agreement. The custodial parent could then be relative-
ly certain that the exemption will not be lost. It could only be lost if the
noncustodial parent successfully invoked the second exception to the gen-
eral rule, by providing more than $1,200 in child support. The custodial
parent should plan to prevent this contingency by providing for a child
support figure sufficiently less than $1,200. This insures that the non-
custodial parent will not increase his payments to an amount above that
figure. Of course, this cannot be done where child support in the range
of several thousand dollars is contemplated, but in such a case the custodial
parent should be willing to give up the exemption in return for such
42. This can be accomplished rather easily, without increasing the periodic
child support payment to the custodial parent. "Support" is now held to include
expenditures for a wide range of items. G. Krawchick, supra note 15, at 1353.
For example, the courts have allowed restaurant expenses paid by a parent on
visitation days, Bernard C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935, 937 (1960), and carfare paid
for a child to visit his father, E. R. Cobb, Sr., 28 T.G. 595, 596 (1957). Thus, a
noncustodial parent who needed only a relatively small increase to go over the
$1,200 minimum could do so by the simple expedient of inviting, his children
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generous support payments. This, however, is seldom the case. One method
of obtaining a total payment from the noncustodial parent of greater
than $1,200 and yet keeping the child support less than this figure is by
appropriate allocation of the total payment between alimony and child
support. Because alimony is generally includible in the taxable income
of the one receiving it,43 and deductible by the one paying it,44 considera-
tion would have to be given to such items as the parents' tax brackets and
the number of exemptions involved.
As a means of preventing the noncustodial parent from increasing
his support expenditures to an amount greater than $1,200, a penalty
clause, providing for an increase in alimony sufficient to cover the lost
exemptions, could be inserted in the divorce decree. A penalty clause could
also be utilized by the noncustodial parent in situations where the agree-
ment gives him the exemption. Here the penalty could be a reduction
in alimony payments in the event the custodial parent attempts to take
the exemptions. 45
In conclusion, the Tax Court, by its decision in LaBay, has restricted
the usefulness of the second exception to the general rule of section 152 (e).
By so doing, the court has done what perhaps should have been done by
Congress. The net result of the decision is probably an injection of more
certainty and predictibility in this area, because the court has given notice
that the second exception to the general rule of section 152 (e) will hence-
forth be difficult to invoke. This encourages the use of the first exception,
which generally permits the parties to resolve the issue in advance with
relative finality, and should reduce the number of disputes and the amount
of litigation in this area.
GEORGE D. NicHoLs
43. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 61 (a) (8), 71.
44. Id. § 215.
45. See Sander, supra note 9, at 712.
[Vol. 37
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/8
RECENT CASES
INCOME TAXATION-INNOCENT TAXPAYER LIABLE
WHEN SPOUSE FAILED TO FILE RETURN-RESULT
UNCHANGED BY 1971 AMENDMENT
United States v. Mitchell1
During the years 1955 through 1959, taxpayer, Mrs. Mitchell, and her
husband resided in the state of Louisiana. During that time, all income
realized by them was deemed community income under that state's com-
munity property laws.2 Employed as a teacher during 1955 and 1956, tax-
payer received a total income for those years of $4200 (her community
interest being half that sum).3 During this five-year period, taxpayer did
not know of her husband's finances and relied upon his assurances that
he had filed tax returns for both of them and had paid amounts due. In
fact, he had filed no federal income tax returns.4 In July, 1960 taxpayer
learned that no returns had been filed. In the same month, she separated
from her husband, and subsequently obtained a divorce. In September,
1961, she formally renounced her community interest and received neither
a distribution of community property nor a property settlement upon
dissolution of the marriage. 5
The Commissioner determined deficiencies in income tax and penalties
against Mrs. Mitchell for one-half of the community income during 1955-59,
and sought to collect the deficiencies from certain separate property which
she had subsequently inherited from her mother and thereafter transferred
to her sister.6 The Tax Court held that under Louisiana community prop-
erty law, taxpayer had an immediate vested ownership interest in one-half
of all community income earned by either spouse and that this ownership
interest made her personally liable for one-half of the tax due on the
community income. The court stated that while a renunciation of com-
munity property will release a person from contractual debts imposed on
that property, such a renunciation will not release tax liability because it
is a debt imposed by law.7
The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that income taxes on community
income are "community debts" and the wife's renunciation of the com-
munity avoided any federal tax liability retroactively assessed on the com-
1. 403 U.S. 190 (1971), rev'g sub nom. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1(5th Cir 1970), rev'g sub noma. Anne Goyne Mitchell, 51 T.C. 641 (1969).
2. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2349 (West 1971).
3. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1970). From the total
earnings of $4,200, income taxes were withheld and subsequently credited against
the deficiency assessed against Mrs. Mitchell and her husband. Id.
4. Anne Goyne Mitchell, 51 T.C. 641, 643 (1969).
5. This renunciation was pursuant to LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2410 (West
1971), which reads:
Both the wife and her heirs or assigns have the privilege of being able
to exonerate themselves from the debts contracted during the marriage, by
renouncing the partnership or community of gains.
6. Mrs. Mitchell's sister, Jane Goyne Sims, was a party only because she
was a transferee without consideration. The Tax Court determined that she
was liable for Mrs. Mitchell's assessed taxes under the transferee provision of
INT. RLv. CODE Of 1954, § 6901. 51 T.C. at 650-51.
7. Id. at 643, 646; see statute quoted note 5 supra.
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munity income.8 After reviewing the pertinent Louisiana statutes, the
court concluded that the wife's interest at the time the tax deficiency was
assessed was too vague and indefinite for tax liability to attach.9
In Angello v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,10 a companion case
to Mitchell, a similar situation was presented to the Fifth Circuit. During
the years 1959 through 1961, Mr. and Mrs. Angello, residents of Louisiana,
filed no income tax returns. Mr. Angello died in 1966, but Metropolitan
refused to pay the proceeds of his life insurance policy to the wife because
a federal lien for delinquent taxes had been filed against the proceeds.
Despite the absence of any formal renunciation on the part of Mrs. Angello,
the government did not contend that the taxpayer had accepted any
benefits of the community. In holding for Mrs. Angello, the Fifth Circuit
relied on its decision in Mitchell."
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holdings in both cases,
relying on the basic tenet that liability for income taxes follows owner-
ship. 2 The Court determined that under the Louisiana property statutes,
each spouse is vested with an immediate one-half ownership interest in
all community property, and that liability for one-half the income taxes
may properly attach to such interest. A subsequent renunciation of the
community can not retroactively defeat this liability; rules of state law
exempting the wife from personal responsibility for community debts are
irrelevant.13
In order to appreciate the impact of the Supreme Court's opinion, it
is initially necessary to review the test for receipt of income. Since its
inception, the federal income tax has been imposed on the "taxable in-
come of every individual."14 Poe v. Seaborn15 and its companion com-
munity property test cases established the standard;' 6 the Court in Seaborn
8. 430 F.2d at 4, where the court said:
Therefore, since income taxes on community income are communitydebts .. . the wife's renunciation of the community is not academic.
Mrs. Mitchell was not attempting to relieve herself of a debt which she
had already incurred, ... but was avoiding the assumption of a liability
which was the liability of the community and which was to be acquitted
out of community funds.
9. Id. at 6.
10. 430 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1970).
11. Id. at 8-9, where the court said:
The wife's interest in the community is of such a character that she
is not personally liable out of her separate property for income taxes
due on community income because the liability for such taxes is a com-
mpnity obligation and does not become her separate obligation unless
she expressly accepts such liability or accepts the benefits of the com-
munity upon its dissolution.
12. 403 U.S. at 194-97. Certiorari was granted on a single petition combining
the Mitchell and Angello cases.
13. But the Court stated: "The results urged by the respondents might follow,
of course, in connection with a tax or other obligation the collection of which
is controlled by state law." Id. at 204.
14. INT. Rmv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1, 3.
15. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
16. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122(1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930). The import of these cases and
Seaborn is that spouses in the community property states of Washington, Arizona,
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said that "use of the word 'of' denotes ownership. It would be a strained
construction, which . . . should impute a broader significance to the
phrase."1 7 Seaborn emphasized that in determining what constitutes own-
ership, one must focus on the rights and legal interests created by state law.
Once that matter is determined, federal law controls the imposition of
the tax.13 The Supreme Court has stated: "State law creates legal interests
and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so
created shall be taxed."1 9 In Mitchell, the Court concluded that "with re-
spect to community income, as with respect to other income, federal income
tax liability follows ownership." 2 0
By the law of Louisiana, a wife acquires a vested interest in all prop-
erty acquired by the community, which is "a partnership in which the
husband and wife own equal shares, their title thereto vesting at the very
moment such property is acquired."2' The interest of an individual spouse
is neither a mere expectancy nor does it arise only upon dissolution of
the community but vests immediately upon acquisition of the property.22
The most persuasive view as to who owns the community income is ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Bender v. Pfaff,23 where the Court applied
the Seaborn reasoning to Louisiana law:
If the test be, as we have held it is, ownership of the community
income, this case is probably the strongest of those presented to
us, in favor of the wife's ownership of one-half of that income....
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana clearly rec-
ognize the wife's ownership of one-half of all the community in-
come .... 24
In its rulings for the taxpayers, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Seaborn
and Pfaff on the ground that they decided that a wife has the "privilege"
to file a separate return for her share of community income.25 In answer
to this, the Supreme Court pointed to the case of United States v. Mal-
colm,2 6 where the Court held that a wife's interest in community property
Texas and Louisiana were entitled to file separate returns, each declaring one-
half of the community income of each "of" them.
17. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 109 (1980).
18. Id. at 110; see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967);
Commissioner v. Harmon, 328 U.S. 44, 50-51 (1944); Helvering v. Stuart, 317
U.S. 154, 162 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940).
19. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940).
20. 403 U.S. at 197. See also Blair v. Commissioner, 800 U.S. 5, 11-14 (1987);
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1981).
21. Succession of Wiener, 208 La. 649, 657, 14 So. 2d 475, 477 (1948). The
court goes on to emphasize the nature of the wife's interest, stating: "The wife's
rights in and to the community property do not rest upon the mere gratuity of
her husband; they are just as great as his and are entitled to equal dignity." Id.
at 666, 14 So. 2d at 480. See also Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1980); Phillips
v. Phillips, 160 La. 818, 107 So. 584 (1926); Theall v. Theall, 7 La. 226 (1887).
22. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 818, 107 So. 584 (1926).
28. 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
24. Id. at 181. See also Wiener v. Fernandez, 60 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. La.),
rev'd on other grounds, 826 U.S. 840 (1945); Succession of Wiener, 208 La. 649,
14 So. 2d 475 (1948).
25. 480 F.2d at 5.
26. 282 U.S. 792 (1981).
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is such that she is required to report one-half of the community income.2 7
The wife's obligation is viewed as a duty rather than a privilege; accord-
ingly, she is liable for taxes on her half.28
Even conceding a wife's vested ownership interest, the Fifth Circuit
held in the alternative, that a wife can escape tax liability by exercising
her right of renunciation under Louisiana law.29 This ruling presented a
difficult problem in the area of tax collection, for it gave the wife-taxpayer
an option to defeat an existing federal tax liability retroactively. In order
to avoid such a result, the Tax Court had held that "income tax is not 'a
debt created by contract'" and further that "[Mrs. Mitchell's] renuncia-
tion came long after her liabilities for the annual income taxes here in
issue had attached. '3 0 In pointing out specifically that "the power to
renounce, granted by Article 2410, is of no comfort to the wife-taxpay-
er.... ,"31 the Supreme Court cited the Tax Court rationale with approval.
The Court also relied on the pronouncement of Professor deFuniak that:
This right of the wife to renounce or repudiate must not be mis-
construed as an indication that she never owned and possessed her
share, for that fact was not denied; but she did have under the
principles of community, the right to revoke her ownership and
possession .... 32
Essentially, the Court stated that all that is required for tax liability is
that an ownership interest, established under applicable state law, exists
at the time liability attaches. The renunciation right under state law does
not impair the basic ownership interest of the wife at the time tax liability
attaches, and any subsequent attempt to repudiate that liability is of no
consequence.
As a final attempt to place complete tax liability upon the husband,
the Fifth Circuit argued that because income taxes were community debts,
they could only be acquitted out of community funds and not from the
27. 403 U.S. at 196. See also Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl.
1961), rev'd on other grounds, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); Van Antwerp v. United States,
92 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1937); Dillin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 228 (1971); Kimes
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 774 (1971).
In Cavanaugh v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1037, 1044 (1940), af'd, 125 F.2d
366 (9th Cir. 1942), the court in discussing the impact of Malcolm said:
Such income must be reported by the individual to whom the statute
attributes it. Clearly, therefore, the petitioner's wife is taxable on one-half
of the community income. She is the owner thereof, although not en-
titled to present possession. This appears to be the inescapable conclusion
to be drawn from ... [the] Malcolm case ....
Consequently, there is no longer the situation whereunder the wife
may at her option return one-half of the income.
28. See Saenger v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1943), where the
court said that because the husband and wife are "co-earners of the income
earned, they are co-payers of the tax on it." See also Smith v. Donnelly, 65 F. Supp.
415, 417 (E.D. La. 1946).
29. 430 F.2d at 6.
30. 51 T.C. at 646; see Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868),
where the Supreme Court held that a tax is an obligation levied by authority of
"law," rather than a debt grounded in contract.
31. 403 U.S. at 204.
32. 1 W. DEFuNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 218, at 621 (1943).
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wife's separate property.33 The Supreme Court did not accept this reason-
ing. Although under the Louisiana statute a wife's separate property is
exempt from community debts, the Court stated that this does not bar
collection of federal taxes from such property and pointed to section 6321
of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.34 This section makes it clear that
no exemption exists for separately owned property, even if it enjoys an
exempt status under state law.35 Thus, just as renunciation does not impair
the wife's basic ownership interest in community property for federal in-
come tax purposes, collection of taxes owed to the United States out of a
wife's separate property is not barred by a state exemption statute.3 6
When a husband and wife file separate returns on income held as
joint tenants, tenants in common or partners, they will ordinarily be
taxed in accordance with their respective interests therein. Generally,
the respective interests in these three types of ownership are easy to discern
and separate when imposing tax liability. However, some difficulty arises
in common law states, like Missouri, that recognize an estate by the
entirety in real property held by husband and wife.3 7 Under the common
law, the husband is entitled to the full use of the estate in entirety and
to its income, during the existence of the marriage. However, the husband's
general position of power has been removed in states which have enacted
statutes such as Missouri's Married Women's Property Act.3 8 In Missouri,
this statute did not destroy estates by the entirety, but rather gave the wife
rights equal to her husband in the ownership.3 9 Accordingly, it has been
33. 420 F.2d at 4. The Fifth Circuit relied on Messersmith v. Messersmith,
229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956), where the Louisiana court held that income
taxes were community debts and, therefore, could be paid only with community
assets.
34. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6321:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount,
addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may
accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, be-
longing to such person.
35. 403 U.S. at 204; accord, United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958);
Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945); United States v. Hefron,
158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1947); United States v. Dallas Nat'l Bank, 152 F.2d 582, 585(5th Cir. 1945). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1 (c) (1954), providing that:
No provision of a State law may exempt property or rights to property
from levy for the collection of any Federal tax. Thus property exempt
from execution under State personal or homestead exemption laws is,
nevertheless, subject to levy by the United States for collection of its taxes.
36. In its opinion in Mitchell, the Fifth Circuit said that the husband should
be liable for all taxes, because of the wife's lack of control over the community.
430 F.2d at 4. This is refuted in 1 W. DFFUNIAX, supra note 32, at §§ 101-02. See
also Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 103-05 (1930).
37. In re Estate of O'Neal, 409 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1966); Schwind v. O'Halloran,
346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940); Hanebrink v. Tower Grove Bank Sc Trust
Co., 321 S.W.2d 524 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); Cullum v. Rice, 236 Mo. App. 1113,
162 S.W.2d 342 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942).
38. § 451.250, RSMo 1969; see Rezabak v. Rezabak, 196 Mo. App. 673, 192
S.W. 107 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917).
39. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918).
See also Rezabak v. Rezabak, 186 Mo. App. 673, 192 S.W. 107 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917).
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held in Missouri that each spouse is entitled to one-half the income from
entireties property and is also liable for one-half the taxes thereon.40 Thus,
in the determination of a spouse's ownership interest for tax liability, there
is a distinct parallel between community property jurisdictions and com-
mon-law states.
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court in concluding its opinion conceded
the resultant harsh consequences for the taxpayers and indicated the need
for corrective legislation.4 ' In 1971, Congress did amend the Internal
Revenue Code to give some protection to an innocent spouse filing a
joint tax return.4 2 Section 6013 (e) of the Code now provides that when
certain conditions exist, a spouse who can prove his own ignorance of his
mate's misrepresentation in a joint return may be relieved of tax liability
for the omission. If a joint return was filed, the innocent spouse must
meet four requirements in order to avoid liability: (1) The omission
must be attributable solely to the other spouse and in excess of 25 percent
of the amount of gross income stated in the return; (2) the innocent spouse
must establish that in signing the return he or she neither knew nor had
any reason to know of the omission; (3) the innocent spouse must not have
benefited directly or indirectly from the misrepresentation; (4) taking
into account all other facts and circumstances it must be inequitable to
hold the innocent spouse liable for the deficiency.4 3 Particularly important
to taxpayers in community property states is section 6013 (e) (2) (A), which
provides that for the purpose of the above tests, the determination of
the spouse to whom items of gross income, other than property, are attrib-
utable is made without regard to community property laws. The Senate
report of the bill stated that if the omitted income was earned by the
husband, it "is to be attributed to the husband, even though it may con-
stitute community property, in determining whether the wife is entitled
to relief.., under this provision." 44 Evidently, this provision would afford
relief to those in situations similar to the taxpayers in the present case
by taxing them only upon the income produced through their efforts.
However, section 6013 (e) as it now reads affords no relief where no
joint return was filed. It is debatable whether Congress even intended to
extend protection to the "innocent spouse" of the non-filing taxpayer.
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court suggested that under the circumstances,
Mrs. Mitchell and Mrs. Angello were negligent and should not prevail.45
40. See Morgan v. Finnegan, 182 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1950); Bernstein v. United
States, 106 F. Supp. 233 (W. D. Mo. 1952); Upthegrove v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A.
952 (1936); Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918);
Rezabak v. Rezabak, 186 Mo. App. 673, 192 S.W. 107 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917).
The theory of vesting of a one-half interest in each spouse, with respect to
ownership interests for income tax purposes, is reinforced by viewing the disposi-
tion of entirety property upon divorce. The legal effect of a divorce decree is to
destroy the estate and replace it with a tenancy in common, each spouse being
vested of an undivided one-half interest in the property. Hiatt v. Hiatt, 168 S.W.2d
1087 (Mo. 1943); Murawski v. Murawski, 208 S.W.2d 262 (K.C. Mo. App. 1948).
41. 403 U.S. at 206.
42. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 6013 (e), 6653 (b).
43. Id. § 6013 (e).
44. S. RFP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
45. 403 U.S. at 205-06.
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However, referring specifically to the 1971 amendment, the Court stated
that "[r]elief of that kind is the answer to the [taxpayer's] situation."48
In view of the great strides taken in granting some protection to the in-
nocent spouse on the joint return, it is only a small step further to provide
the same relief to the innocent spouse whose mate filed no return. If
any congressional intent can be said to permeate the amendment, it must
be an intent to protect an innocent spouse. There is little difference
between a spouse who relies on her mate's veracity in reporting the amount
of income earned (who is granted relief under the amendment) and the
spouse who relies on her mate's representation that he filed an income
tax return (who gains no protection). It is rather inequitable, under sec-
tion 6018 (e) (1) (c), to hold the innocent non-filing spouse liable.
The courts have not yet given many clues as to how they will interpret
the 1971 amendment.47 Thus, it is difficult to venture any opinion as to
the direction they will take in applying the amendment's provisions.
Admittedly, it would be a strained construction to say that section
6013 (e) (1) (c), which brings the fairness of the situation into play to deter-
mine whether an innocent spouse should be responsible for the conduct
of her mate, overrides the mandates of the amendment's other provisions.
Yet, the apparent intent of 6013 (e) (1) (c) lends some support to a con-
tention that the provision that seems to require the filing of a joint return
should be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory. To deem the
provision directory would recognize the express legislative intent to effect
an equitable result and grant relief to all taxpayers who have been
deceived by their spouse.
The tax plight of the innocent spouse has been acknowledged for
many years; yet, only recently has any action been directed against it.
The protections afforded by the long overdue 1971 amendment are com-
mendable, but may not be enough. If they are not, Congress should
promptly react to provide the additional relief necessary to protect innocent
spouses, who find themselves in situations similar to those of Mrs. Mitchell
and Mrs. Angello.
STEPHEN D. ALIBER
46. Id. at 206.
47. In Wissing v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971), the innocent
wife of an embezzler was relieved of tax liability for the two years in which she
met the new law's requirements of the total three year period in question. The
court said that the change in law was retroactive and applied to all taxable years
to which the 1954 or 1939 Code applies. In Herbert I. Joss, 56 T.C. 378 (1971), an
innocent husband was refused the amendment's protections because he knew of
his wife's receipt of income at the time of filing the joint return. In United States
v. Maxwell, 330 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1971), the court held that even though
the amendment was retroactive in effect, an innocent wife who did not appeal
from the original Tax Court decision could not avoid its res judicata effect. The
court said that the amendment "does not open a year which has been closed by
the statute of limitations, res judicata, or otherwise." Id. at 1257.
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PLEADING-COMMENCEMENT OF A DIVERSITY ACTION
FOR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURPOSES
Chappell v. Rouchl
Plaintiff, a Kansas citizen, and defendant, an Indiana citizen, were
involved in an auto accident in Kansas. The complaint was filed in the
United States District Court for Kansas on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship.2 Although the complaint was filed before the applicable Kansas
statute of limitations had run, proper service was not obtained until after
such time. A Kansas statute3 states that, unless defendant is served with
process within 90 days after a petition is filed, an action is not deemed to
have commenced until he is served. Defendant was not served until after
the 90-day period.4 Therefore, defendant moved for summary judgment
on the theory that the statute of limitations had run, barring plaintiff's
action. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that rule 3 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure was applicable. Rule 8 provides that: "An action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Therefore, it was argued,
the filing of the complaint in timely fashion satisfied the requirements
of the statute of limitations. The district court held that federal rule 3
governed and that the plaintiff had not violated the statute of limitations.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.5
The basic problem presented in Chappell is which rule-federal rule
3 or state rule-determines when a diversity action commences for statute
of limitations purposes. The courts of appeals are split on this issue.6
The first inquiry is whether rule 3 is broad enough to affect the appli-
cation of statutes of limitations in diversity actions. There is strong au-
thority for the proposition that rule 8 is not meant to be this broad.7 Of
course, if it is not, the inquiry ends. But, even if rule 3 is said to be this
broad, the ultimate "substantive right" problem remains. Congress has
the power to make rules governing practice and procedure in the federal
courts8 and has delegated this power to the Supreme Court via the Rules
Enabling Act.9 However, Congress explicitly provided that the rules that
the Supreme Court promulgates pursuant to this act shall affect no sub-
1. 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
2. See Judiciary & Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-203 (1963).
4. 448 F.2d at 447.
5. Id. at 451.
6. See text accompanying notes 30-46 infra.
7. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965); accord, O'Shea v. Bins-
wanger, 42 F.R.D. 21, 23 (D. Md. 1967); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1057, at 191 (1969).
8. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
9. Judiciary 8. Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970):
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules . . . the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts
of appeals of the United States in civil actions ....
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stantive right.10 Presumably, this express prohibition includes state sub-
stantive law.11
The problem is complicated further by the confusion emanating from
two Supreme Court cases. These cases are particularly important to an
analysis of the present conflict among the courts of appeals. Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.12 was a diversity suit in which the
then applicable Kansas two-year period of limitations elapsed between the
filing of plaintiff's petition and the service of summons upon defendant.
Plaintiff, of course, argued that federal rule 3 was applicable, while de-
fendant contended that the state rule applied, barring the action. The
district court held for plaintiff. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the state requirement of service of summons
within the statutory period was an integral part of the then applicable
statute of limitations.13 Ruling that Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 14 governed,
the court concluded that, since the action could not have been maintained
in a state court, the action was barred in a federal court.15 The Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding but substituted its own, am-
biguous rationale. 16 The Court first relied on Guaranty Trust and seemed
to say that the state rule always determined when a diversity action com-
mences for statute of limitations purposes.' 7 However, the Court explicitly
made reference to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that the
state rule was an integral part of the state statute of limitations,' 8 imply-
ing perhaps that, if the state rule for when an action commences is not
an integral part of the statute of limitations, federal rule 3 governs.
The ambiguity in Ragan sired two different interpretations. Some
courts said Ragan held that, where a state statute of limitations contains
as an integral part 19 the steps necessary to toll the statute of limitations,
the state rule, not rule 8, controls.20 These same courts said that, if the
state rule for commencement of an action is not an integral part of the
statute of limitations, then rule 3 applies.2 ' Other courts, reading Ragan
more broadly, said that Ragan held that a federal court in a diversity suit
10. Id.
11. See McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51
VA. L. REv. 884, 901-02 (1965).
12. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). Before this case, the courts almost unanimously
held that federal rule 3 determined when a diversity action was commenced so
as to toll a statute of limitations. 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcncE 3.07, at 773-76
(2d ed. 1970).
13. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532
(1949).
14. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In this case the Court held that a cause of action
barred in state court could not be brought in federal court.
15. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 987, 991-92
(10th Cir. 1948).
16. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949).
17. Id. at 532-34.
18. Id. at 534.
19. It is unclear what is meant by "integral part." See Comment, Federal
Rule 3 and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases, 20
STAN. L. REv. 1281, 1293 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Glebus v. Fillmore, 104 F. Supp. 902 (D. Conn. 1952); 2 J.
MooRE, supra note 12, 1 3.07, at 777-79.
21. 2 J. MooRE, supra note 12, 3.07, at 777.
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must always look to state law to determine when the applicable statute of
limitations is tolled.22
The second Supreme Court case which has caused confusion is Hanna
v. Plumer.23 It involved a diversity suit in which service was made in com-
pliance with federal rule 4 (d) (1) by leaving the summons and complaint
at the residence of defendant. However, the relevant state law required
that service be made in person.2 4 Thus, defendant moved for summary
judgment on the basis of improper service. The district court granted
summary judgment for defendant, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court, viewing the situation
as one involving direct conflict between federal rule 4 (d) (1) and the con-
trary state rule, resolved the conflict in favor of the federal rule.2 5
Hanna is important in this context because of what it said about Ragan
and the federal rules in general. The Court first said that federal rule 3
was narrower than the plaintiff in Ragan had contended.2 6 In that case,
plaintiff had contended that compliance with federal rule 3 tolled the
applicable statute of limitations. From this one can argue that rule 3 is
inapplicable to the resolution of statute of limitations problems in diversity
suits. But, while being careful not to overrule Ragan, the Court went on
to reject what was arguably the basis of the decision in Ragan, i.e., that
because the action would have been barred in a state court, the action was
barred in a federal court. 27 Further, the Court's attitude toward the overall
applicability of the federal rules in diversity actions seemed to suggest that,
in most conflicts between a federal rule and a state rule, the federal rule
should prevail.28 Moreover, Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, asserted that
the result in Hanna could not have been reached without overruling
Ragan.20 Thus, Hanna is important because of its conflicting implications
about the validity of Ragan.
As a result of the confusion surrounding both Ragan and Hanna, the
courts of appeals differ in their interpretations. The result is that some
of the courts of appeals have held that the state rule determines when a
diversity action commences for statute of limitations purposes, while others
have held that federal rule 3 governs that question.
Those courts of appeals which hold for the state rule find that Ragan
requires such a holding and that Hanna has not overruled Ragan. These
courts read Ragan in one of two ways discussed previously: (1) Ragan
requires that the state rule always governs, or (2) Ragan requires that a
state rule controls if the state rule on commencement is an integral part
of the statute of limitations. In either case the primary question is whether
Hanna overruled Ragan. In Groninger v. Davison,30 for example, the
22. See, e.g., Myers v. Slotkin, 13 F.R.D. 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); 2 J. MooRs,
supra note 12, ff 3.07 at 778.
23. 380 U.S. 460 (1965), rev'g 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
24. MAss. GEN LAws ANN. ch. 197, § 9 (1958).
25. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965).
26. Id. at 470.
27. Id. at 469; see Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530, 533 (1949).
28. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
29. Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. s7
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss4/8
RECENT CASES
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ragan required that the state
rule always controls in determining when a diversity action was com-
menced for statute of limitations purposes.31 While admitting that it was
difficult to reconcile Hanna with Ragan, the court went on to say that
the fact that the Supreme Court had carefully avoided overruling Ragan
was reason enough to require lower courts to continue to follow it.32 In
Sylvester v. Messier,33 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam
opinion, said that Ragan required that the state rule govern in spite of
Hanna. Most recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Anderson v.
Papillion,34 said that a federal court in a diversity action could not give a
cause of action longer life than it would have had in the state court, and
therefore the state rule was applicable rather than federal rule 3.35 This
court admitted that Ragan had its critics, but cited Professor Wright for
the proposition that Ragan remains viable.3 6
The two courts of appeals which hold that federal rule 3 governs
when a diversity action commences for statute of limitations purposes
differ in their rationales. In Sylvestri v. TVarner & Swasey Co., 37 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, like those circuits holding for the state rule,
said that Ragan requires application of the state rule unless Hanna has
modified it. That court concluded that Hanna requires a consideration of
the choice between state and federal rules beyond an automatic applica-
tion of Ragan.38 Having accepted this proposition, the court went on to
examine the situation in light of what Hanna considered to be the principal
aim in resolving conflicts of this sort, i.e., discouragement of forum shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.3 9 The court held
that, because application of federal rule 3 did not adversely affect these
aims, rule 3 controlled.40 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 41 in
Chappell v. Rouch,42 the instant case, was able to reach the same result
31. Id. at 641; accord, Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1967);
Gatliff v. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970).
32. Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1966); accord, O'Shea
v. Binswanger, 42 F.R.D. 21, 23 (D. Md. 1967).
33. 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
34. 445 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1971).
35. Id. at 842; accord, Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp.
399, 402 (W.D. La. 1970); O'Shea v. Binswanger, 42 F.R.D. 21, 23 (D. Md. 1967);
Magid v. Decker, 251 F. Supp. 955, 960 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
36. Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1971). Professor Wright
reasons that it is "safer" to conclude that Ragan remains viable since the Supreme
Court went to great lengths to distinguish Ragan in Hanna. C. WRIGHT, FnEDEA.L
CouRTs § 59, at 246 (2d ed. 1970).
37. 398 F.2d 598, 605 (2d Cir. 1968).
38. Id.; accord, Wheeler v. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1177,
1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
39. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
40. Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 605-06 (2d Cir. 1968).
There are district courts in various circuits which agree with the Second Circuit.
Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.R.D. 148, 150 (D. Del. 1969); Grabowski v.
United States, 294 F. Supp. 421, 423 (D. Wyo. 1968); Teets v. Hawker, 278 F.
Supp. 834, 838 (N.D.W. Va. 1968); Hardy v. Green, 277 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D.
Mass. 1967) (dictum); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Callan v. Lillybelle, Ltd., 39 F.R.D. 600, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
41. It should be noted that Ragan also came out of the Tenth Circuit.
42. 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
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without considering whether Hanna had overruled Ragan.4 3 The court
said that Ragan stood for the narrow proposition that, where the state
rule for commencement of an action is an integral part of the statute of
limitations, federal rule 3 must yield to the state rule.44 Since the court
found that the state rule for commencement of an action was not an
integral part of the statute of limitations, the court was able to distinguish
Ragan.45 Next, the court found that the state rule was merely a rule of
procedure and, thus, characterized the problem as one involving a clash
between two multi-purpose, procedural rules for determining when a civil
action is deemed to commence. Applying Hanna, the court held that under
these circumstances federal rule 3 should control.4 6
One thing that these courts have in common is that they fail to discuss
analytically whether application of rule 3 abridges state substantive rights.
The courts which follow Ragan have implicitly found that application of
rule 3 does abridge substantive rights. Ragan was arguably based on the
ground that, because application of federal rule 3 would change the out-
come of the case, the state rule governed.4 7 Such a mechanical test, however,
fails to analyze clearly the state's interest in establishing its own rule
for the commencement of a civil action. Similarly, the courts which have
held that rule 3 is applicable do not clearly analyze the state's interest
in establishing its own rule for commencement. For example, in Sylvestri
v. Warner & Swasey Co.,48 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that
application of rule 3 did not abridge a state substantive right merely be-
cause the state considered its rule to be procedural. 49 In Chappell v.
Rouch,5o the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no abridgement of a
state substantive right for two reasons. First, the state rule of commence-
ment was not in the same article as the statute of limitations. 51 Second,
the state legislature had entitled the article which did contain the rule for
commencement "Rules of Civil Procedure." 52 It is easy to understand this
lack of analysis, given the "ghost-like" nature of the procedure-substance
distinction, but with the command that federal courts in diversity suits
must apply federal procedural law and state substantive law, this problem
needs to be solved.5 3 Unfortunately, at the present time the only guidance
43. The district judge thought the case was factually similar to Ragan, but
the analysis of the effect of Hanna on Ragan in Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co.,
898 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968), convinced him that Ragan had been modified. Chap-
pell v. Rouch, Civil No. W-4115, (D. Kan., filed Feb. 13, 1969), aff'd on other
grounds, 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
44. 448 F.2d at 450.
45. Id. The court noted that the Kansas statute of limitations which had been
in effect when Ragan was decided was subsequently revised so that the rule for
commencement was no longer an integral part of the statute. Id. at 448.
46. Id. at 450-51.
47. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 37 U.S. 530, 533
(1949).
48. 898 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 606.
50. 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 449-50.
52. Id.
53. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
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as to whether application of rule 3 abridges state substantive rights lies in
these rather mechanical tests.
: With the Eighth, Sixth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals applying
the state rule and the Second and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals apply-
ing federal rule 3 to determine when an action is commenced for statute
of limitations purposes, it is hoped the Supreme Court will soon address
itself to the problem. It is likely that the Court's decision will depend on
its view of the breadth of federal rule 3 in diversity actions. This question
was expressly loft to the courts by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee."
If the Court holds that rule 3 has no effect with respect to a statute of
limitations in a diversity action, the state rule will control by default.55
If, on the other hand, the Court decides that rule 3 is broad enough to
address itself to a statute of limitations in a diversity suit, it is submitted
that rule 3 will prevail. For, if the Court says rule 3 is applicable to this
situation, then rule 3, will be in direct conflict with a number of state
rules, and Hanna seems to require that the federal rule should prevail in
such circumstances.56
The Court might, however, decide that Hanna went too far in its
deference to the federal rules. In his concurring opinion in Hanna, Justice
Harlan stated that the Court gave too much deference to the federal rules
and suggested a more stringent standard for determining whether a fed-
eral rule or a state rule should govern in a diversity action.57 Nevertheless,
Justice Harlan thought that, no matter which standard is applied to de-
termine if state or federal rules control, federal rule 3 should govern for
statute of limitations purposes in a diversity action, because its applica-
tion in such circumstances would have only a minimal effect on "private
activity" and would further the federal interest of proceeding under its
own rules.58 It is submitted that if the Court does use a standard more
protective of state rights than that in Hanna, it will still find that applica-
tion of federal rule 3 for statute of limitations purposes in a diversity
action has only a minimal effect on "private activity." Such an application
of rule 3 has no effect on private conduct before the cause of action
accrues. After the cause of action accrues, application of rule 3 would
54. See 2 J. MoORE, supra note 12, 3.07, at 740.
55. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
56. Id. at 471:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question
facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can
refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress
erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
57. Id. a 475-76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 477:
I think that the decision [Ragan] was wrong. At most, application of
the Federal Rule would have meant that potential Kansas tort defendants
would have to defer for a few days the satisfaction of knowing that they
had not been sued within the limitations period. The choice of the Federal
Rule would have had no effect on the primary stages of private activity
from which torts arise, and only the most minimal effect on behavior
following the commission of the tort. In such circumstances the interest of
the federal system in proceeding under its own rules should have prevailed.
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mean, at most, that in a few limited situations a defendant would have to
wait for a few more days after the statute of limitations period has expired
in order to be assured that a complaint has not been filed against him.
With such a minimal effect on private conduct, the federal interest in
uniformity should prevail.
Until the Supreme Court settles this matter, whether federal rule 3
or the state rule governs commencement of a diversity action for statute
of limitations purposes will remain an open question. Since the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals commands compliance with the state rule,5 a
plaintiff bringing suit in a Missouri district court on diversity grounds
is best advised to commence the action in accordance with the state rule.
On the other hand, a litigant who is forced to rely on the federal rule,
as in Chappell v. Rouch,6O should be on fairly solid ground in arguing
that the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals be reversed.
JAmEs S. ArLLN, Jn.
PROPERTY-FUTURE INTERESTS-CONSTRUCTION OF A
LIFE TENANCY WITH ABSOLUTE POWER TO DISPOSE OF
THE FEE FOLLOWED BY A GIFT OVER
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton1
I. Powell Morton devised his interest in certain Georgia real property
to his wife
for her life [with] absolute power to dispose of said real property
during her life. Upon her death, if she has not so disposed of said
real property, I give said real property to my brother, Tunis
Morton if he is then living and if he is not then living, [to those
residuary devisees who are then living]32
The residue was devised to the defendants, named nieces and nephews of
the testator.
Tunis Morton predeceased the testator. After the testator's death, his
widow sold the Georgia property and put the proceeds, amounting to
$59,331.40, in a revocable trust for the benefit of herself and her own
relatives. Mrs. Morton used none of the proceeds during her life. It should
be noted that, whereas the residue was devised to the residuary devisees
who survived the testator, the remainder in the land was devised to the
residuary devisees who survived his widow. All of the residuary devisees
appear to have survived both.
Plaintiff, the trustee of the trust created by Mrs. Morton, sued for
construction of Mr. Morton's will to determine the ownership of the pro-
59. Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1966).
60. 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
1. 468 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. 1971).
2. Id. at 194.
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ceeds of the sale of the Georgia land. The trial court found that Mrs.
Morton took a life estate in both the property and the proceeds from
the sale and that at her death the defendants were entitled to the proceeds
as remaindermen.3 The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that
the widow's power of disposition had not enlarged the life estate to a fee
in either the land or the proceeds from its sale. This being so, the widow's
life interest in the proceeds was followed either by a remainder created
by the quoted clause of the will or a reversionary interest which would
pass under the residuary clause. It was held that the defendants, who were
both the remaindermen under the quoted clause and also the residuary
legatees, were entitled to the proceeds as remaindermen.4
The first problem facing the court was to determine the nature of
the interest initially given to Mrs. Morton. The estate to the first taker
has two possible constructions: a life estate or a fee simple absolute.5 A
fee simple is usually said to result when there has been a general or non-
specific devise to the first taker with a broad power of disposition followed
by a limitation over. 6 For example, a devise of Blackacre to X with absolute
power to sell, convey, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of as he sees fit
and at his death, if he has failed to dispose of Blackacre, to Y is usually
taken to create a fee simple in X. 7 Under this construction, the limitation
over to Y on X's failure to dispose of the fee is most often classified as a
void executory interest.8 This is because the executory interest is said to
be repugnant to the notion that a fee, by its very nature, should pass by
intestacy to the fee owner's heirs if the estate has not been disposed of by
inter vivos conveyance or devise.9 There have been instances, however,
where the executory interest has been held to be valid.10
However, when the first estate is expressly given for life with the added
power to sell, convey, or dispose of the property absolutely, the power is
insufficient to enlarge the estate in the land of the first taker to a fee."
3. Id. at 195.
4. Id. at 198.
5. 3 L. SiMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERSTS § 1489 (2d ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as Saims 8& SMITH].
6. Note, Enlargement of Life Estates to Fees Simple by the Annexation of
a Power, 18 ST. Louis L. REV. 243 (1933).
7. 3 Siu.s.s & SMITH § 1489; see, e.g., Jackson ex dem. Livingston v. Robins, 16
Johns. Gas. 537 (N.Y. Ct. Err. & App. 1819).
8. Moore, Executory Limitations Following Power of Disposal, 17 Mo. L.
REv. 177, 179 (1952); Nelson, Restraints on Alienation in Missouri, 39 U. Mo.
Bu.. L. SER. 23, 24 (1928).
9. Howard v. Carusi, 109 U.S. 725 (1883); Scott v. Smith, 286 Ky. 697, 151
S.W.2d 770 (1941); Vaughan v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328 (1950);
McDowell v. Brown, 21 Mo. 57 (1855). See generally W. ECKHARDT & P. PETERSON,
POSSESSORY ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND CONVEYENCES IN MISSOURI § 59 (1952);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406, illus. 8, at 2401 (1944); 3 SimEs & SMITH § 1482.
10. See generally A. KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 720-23 (2d ed. 1920). The
executory interest contingent upon failure to dispose of the fee has been validated
by statute in New Jersey and West Virginia. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:3-16 (1951); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-16 (1966).
11. Blumer v. Gillespie, 338 Mo. 1113, 93 S.W.2d 939 (1936); Hamner v.
Edmonds, 327 Mo. 281, 36 S.W.2d 929 (1931); Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 281, 14
S.W. 52- (1890); Rubey v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 3, 49 Am. Dec. 112, (1848). See also
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § i1, comment c at 354 (1936); 2 SimEs & SMITH §
893; Note, supra note 6, at 245.
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If the power of sale or disposition has not been exercised during the life
tenancy, the property will pass to the remainderman at the life tenant's
death.12 Some jurisdictions have adopted statutes modifying this common
law rule. Generally, they provide that the life tenant with absolute power
of disposition takes a fee with respect to creditors, purchasers, or encum-
brancers, but that any future interest is preserved should the power of
disposition not be exercised.' 3
Where the limitation is construed as giving the first taker a life tenancy
followed by a remainder, the effect of the exercise of the power of disposi-
tion by the life tenant on the remainder becomes the central issue. Under
the minority view, the remainder is viewed merely as an interest in it
specific piece of property, and the sale of that property (no matter what
the scope of the power) cuts off the remainderman entirely.14 Even if
the remainder interest is not in a specific piece of property, if the power
of disposition is very broad, giving the life tenant the authority to dispose
of the property either by deed, gift, or will, then too the exercise of the
power will often be said to destroy the remainder.1 5 When the remainder-
man is cut off by the exercise of the power, the proceeds obtained thereby
may, depending on the scope of the power granted and the view of the
jurisdiction in question, either go to the life tenant absolutely and pass
through his estate if undisposed of at his death16 or, at the life tenant's
death, pass through the testator's estate to his residuary legatees, or by
intestacy to his next of kin if there are no residuary legatees.27
The majority approach preserves the remainder even though the power
of disposition is exercised; the proceeds are regarded as a substitution for
the real property and they pass to the remainderman subject to the life
tenant's interest.18 If the proceeds have been reinvested in either real
property' 9 or personal property,20 the remainderman will still take at
12. Glidewell v. Glidewell, 360 Mo. 713, 230 S.W.2d 752 (1950); Russell
v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 82 (1884); Moore, supra note 8, at 182.
13. 3 SIMm & Smarru § 1491. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 76 (1958):
When an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by any trust,
is given to the owner of a particular estate for life or years, such estate
is changed into a fee absolute, as to the rights of creditors and purchasers,
but subject to any future estates limited thereon, in case the power is not
executed, or the lands sold for the satisfaction of debts, during the con-
tinuance of such particular estate.
See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1005 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-05-39 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 262 (1971); S.D. CoMPiLED LAws ANN. § 43-11-18 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-106 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 55.1-7 (Supp. 1970); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-16 (1966).
14. McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 125 P.2d 633 (1942); Lawrence v.
Beardsley, 74 Conn. 1, 49 A. 190 (1901).
15. Grace v. Perry, 197 Mo. 550, 95 S.W. 875 (En Banc 1906); Summers,
Power of a Life Tenant to Divpose of a Fee, 6 IND. L.J. 137, 138 (1930).
16. Reddin v. Cottrell, 178 Ark. 1178, 13 S.W.2d 813 (1929); McLaughlin v.
Collins, 109 Colo. 377, 125 P.2d 633 (1942).
17. Lawrence v. Beardsley, 74 Conn. 1, 49 A. 190 (1901).
18. Annot., 158 A.L.R. 480 (1945).
19. Olson v. Weber, 194 Iowa 512, 187 N.W. 465 (1922); Howell v. Alex-
ander, 3 N.C. App. 371, 165 S.E.2d 256 (1969).
20. Smith v. Cain, 187 Ala. 174, 65 So. 367. (1914); Edds v. Mitchell, 143
Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945).
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the life tenant's death despite the change in the form of the estate created
by the exercise of the power of disposition.21
Depending on the specific wording of the power granted and the
attitude of the jurisdiction in question, the life tenant's right to use the
proceeds from a sale of the property may give him a right to an interest
in the proceeds only,22 the right to consume the corpus entirely during
his lifetime,23 or something between. The life tenant's interest in the pro-
ceeds of a sale is usually no greater than in the property which was sold.2 4
However, where there has been specific provision that the proceeds from
the sale are to go to the life tenant absolutely and free from the interests
of the remainderman, courts have been willing to enforce this provision,
and title to the proceeds will vest in the life tenant absolutely. 25
If the life tenant has an absolute power of disposition during his
life with a limitation over of "undisposed" property or of "what remains,"
he may be entitled to use the proceeds for his personal benefit,26 even to
the point of consuming the entire corpus, thereby cutting off the remainder-
man.2 7 However, where the particular use is not specified, courts have
consistently allowed the proceeds to be spent for the "support and mainte-
nance" of the life tenant.2 8 In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, the
instant case, although the court was not called upon to rule on the scope
of the life tenant's power to use the proceeds, there is dictum indicating
that she "had the right to use any part of the proceeds which she might
choose, during her life . . .'29 This language appears to indicate that
Mrs. Morton would be allowed to dispose of the proceeds for more than
merely bare subsistence support; however, since there was no holding
on this issue, it would be imprudent to rely on this case as authorizing
the life tenant's unlimited discretion in spending the proceeds. A possible
21. Redman v. Barger, 118 Mo. 568, 24 S.W. 177 (1893).
22. Barton v. Barton, 288 Ill. 338, 119 N.E. 320 (1918); In re Blauvelt, 181
N.Y. 249, 80 N.E. 194 (1892); Mooy v. Gallagher, 36 R.I. 405, 90 A. 668 (1914).
23. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. 1971); Guthrie
v. Crews, 286 Mo. 488, 229 S.W. 182 (1921); Coyle v. Underwood, 41 Ohio Op.
461, 88 N.E.2d 189 (P. Ct. 1948); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 1243, 1297 (1919).
24. Olson v. Weber, 194 Iowa 512, 187 N.W. 465 (1922); Weinstein v. Weber,
178 N.Y. 94, 70 N.E. 115 (1904). West Virginia has codified this result in W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 86-1-16 (1966):
The proceeds of a disposal under such power shall be held subject to the
same limitations and the same power of use or disposal as the original
property, unless a contrary intent shall appear from the conveyence or
will .... (emphasis added).
25. Lickteig v. Lickteig, 236 Ky. 540, 38 S.W.2d 641 (1980); Davis v. Badlam,
165 Mass. 248, 43 N.E. 91 (1896).
26. Patch v. Smith, 113 Colo. 186, 155 P.2d 765 (1945); Quarton v. Barton,
249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 (1930); Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411, 2 S.W.
292 (1886); see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 6, 24 (1970).
27. In re Estate of Morse, 9 Cal. App. 3d 411, 88 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1970);
Hutchinson's Estate v. Arnt, 210 Ind. 509, 1 N.E.2d 585 (1936); McCarthy v. Mc-
Carthy, 178 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 1970); Frederick v. Frederick, 355 Mass. 662, 247
N.E.2d 361 (1969); Guthrie v. Crews, 286 Mo. 438, 229 S.W. 182 (1921).
28. Gent v. Thomas, 368 Mo. 528, 252 S.W.2d 345 (1952); Threlkeld v.
Threlkeld, 288 Mo. 459, 141 S.W. 1121 (1911); Harbison v. James, 90 Mo. 411, 2
S.W. 292 (1886).
29. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Morton, 468 S.W.2d 193, 198 (1971).
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inference to be drawn from the court's emphasis on the word "use" is
that the life tenant would not be allowed to give away the proceeds
unless specifically authorized. It is the general rule that a life tenant is
not permitted to make inter vivos gifts of the proceeds 30 or to dispose
of the proceeds by will.3 1 Nor, may he set up a trust for his own benefit
with the principal to be paid over at his death to a beneficiary other than
the named remainderman.32
Some courts have imposed a quasi-trust on the proceeds with the life
tenant acting as a quasi-trustee with respect to the remainderman's in-
terest.33 The quasi-trustee has the obligation to preserve the proceeds for
the remainderman subject to the life tenancy.34
By bearing in mind the many areas subject to costly litigation, the
draftsman might eliminate the problems before they arise, so that the
testator's intent may be fully realized. If the first taker is to have a life
estate, it should be expressly and unambiguiously stated. A court might
construe an indefinite bequest as giving the first taker the fee and thereby
destroy the limitation over.3 5 If the testator desires the first taker to have
the power to convey or dispose of the real property, he should explicitly
give the life tenant the power to convey in fee. Otherwise there may be
some question whether the life tenant is able to convey a fee or a life estate
only. Therefore, the property may have limited marketability during the
first taker's lifetime.3 6
If the life tenant is to have unlimited use of the proceeds, the instru-
ment should provide in express language that if the property is sold,
absolute title to the proceeds is to vest in the life tenant, free of the re-
mainderman's interest. If there is no such provision, the court may impose
limitations on the life tenant's power to use the proceeds.3 7 If the life
tenant is to be limited in his use of the proceeds, the purposes for which
he may expend the proceeds should be enumerated as well as his power
to invade the corpus for the specified uses.38
30. Bell v. Killian, 266 Ala. 12, 93 So. 2d 769 (1957); Hardy v. Mayhew,
158 Cal. 95, 110 P. 113 (1910); Tague v. Tague, 248 Iowa 1258, 85 N.W.2d 22(1957); Cook v. Higgins, 290 Mo. 402, 235 S.W. 807 (En Banc 1921); Burnet v.
Burnet, 244 Mo. 491, 148 S.W. 872 (1912); 4 Siass &¢ SMiTH § 1716; 7 ST. Louis L.
REv. 190 (1921).
31. Hollerich v. Gronbach, 342 Ill. App. 242, 96 N.E.2d 354 (1950); Rapp
v. Matthais, 35 Ind. 332 (1871); Struck v. Lilly, 219 Ky. 604, 293 S.W. 153 (1927).
32. Parsons v. Smith, 190 Kan. 569, 376 P.2d 899 (1962).
33. See generally Annot., 137 A.L.R. 1054 (1942).
34. Wiktorowicz v. Haley, 251 A.2d 794 (Me. 1969); Buford v. Aldridge, 165
Mo. 419, 63 S.W. 109 (En Banc), modified per curiam, 65 S.W. 720 (En Banc
1901); Trute v. Skeede, 162 Neb. 266, 75 N.W.2d 672 (1956); Howell v. Alexander,
3 N.C. App. 371, 165 S.E.2d 256 (1969); Woodbridge v. Woodbridge, 88 W. Va.
187, 106 S.E. 437 (1921).
35. Note, Life Estate With Power of Disposal, 32 NomRE DAmz LAw. 141
(1956).
36. Id.; Note, Powers: Life Estate With Unlimited Power of Disposition, 13
OKa. L. REv. 454, 455 (1960).
37. See generally Annot., 158 A.L.R. 480 (1945).
38. Where the langue of the devise is imprecise or very broad, the court may
find no power at all to invade the corpus. See Bramwell v. Cole, 136 Mo. 201, 37
S.W. 924 (1896); Lewis v. Pitman, 101 Mo. 281, 14 S.W. 52 (1890); Annot., 31
A.L.R.3d 6, 21 (1970).
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It might also be prudent to provide for the creation of a trust, should
the property be sold, for the benefit of the life tenant with the corpus
or whatever remains thereof to be paid over at his death to the remainder-
man.3 9 Otherwise the life tenant may not take his responsibilities as a
quasi-trustee seriously, and at his death the remainderman may discover
that the proceeds have been expended for unauthorized purposes or so
commingled with the life tenant's assets that they are no longer identifiable
as separate property. 40
ELLEN S. SHEAR
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-CORPORATE STOCK SPLITS
In re Estate of Leonard'
A will bequeathed 1450 shares of common stock in American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company to nieces and nephews of the testatrix.
Four and one-half years after the will was executed there was a two-for-one
split of the stock. Because of this the testatrix owned 2900 shares at the
time of her death. The probate court ordered all 2900 shares distributed
to the nieces and nephews. The circuit court reversed and ordered distribu-
tion of the added shares to the residuary legatees. In the Missouri Supreme
Court the nieces and nephews prevailed and thus received all 2900 shares
of stock.2
The courts of a majority of jurisdictions3 have ostensibly made the
disposition of increased stock, resulting from a stock split, depend on
whether the legacy is general or specific.4 The rationale of this approach
is based on section 24 of the English Wills Act of 1837, which stated that
39. 1 SIMEs & SMITH § 358; Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal, 39
YALE L.J. 771, 779 (1930).
40. See Note, supra note 36, at 454.
1. 467 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1971).
2. The court rejected the argument of the residuary legatees that the failure
of the testatrix to increase the legacy during the 17 months and 13 days between
the stock split and the death of the testatrix indicated a desire that the legacy
to the nieces and nephews should not be increased.
3. Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 744, 232 A.2d 789, 792 (1967); see
Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 276 (1949). Under UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-607 and RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 244, comment b, illus. 2 (1940), the increase goes to
the named legatee if the legacy is specific. This implies that the classification of
the legacy is determinative.
4. In 2 T. JARMAN, WILLS 1037 (8th ed. 1951), the two-types of legacies are
explained as follows:
A general legacy is a gift of something to be furnished out of the testator's
general personal estate ....
A specific legacy is a gift of a particular part of the testator's personal
property belonging to him at his death. Usually the subject matter of a
specific legacy belongs to the testator at the date of the will, as where
he gives to A "my gold watch" or "the [bonds] now standing in my name."
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a general legacy speaks as of the time of the death of the testator.5 Thus,
in interpreting general legacies, a court does not consider the effect of the
stock split or determine the intention of the testator at the time of the
execution of the will. Rather, the court interprets the will as a declaration
of intention made immediately before death. Thus, in the Leonard case,
if the bequest was general, the will operated to bequeath 1450 shares to
the nieces and nephews. However, a contrary result is reached when the
legacy is found to be specific, since the will is then considered to speak
as of the time of execution.0 Such a finding allows the court to look back
to the circumstances existing at the time the will was executed. Taking
these circumstances into account, the court can easily find that the testator
intended to bequeath the specified number of shares as they existed at the
time the will was executed. Since a stock split is merely a change in form
of the legacy,7 the named legatee receives the additional shares resulting
therefrom. In summary, the English Wills Act dictated that the legatee
of a general legacy does not get an increase resulting from a stock split and
that the legatee of a specific legacy does get the increase.8
The effect of the English Wills Act is magnified by a judicial prefer-
ence for general legacies. This preference is usually attributed to the fact
that specific legacies are subject to ademption if their subject matter is
disposed of by the testator after the execution of the will. Because it is
presumed that the testator intended that the legatee receive something,
courts tend to favor general legacies because such a construction commonly
makes the gift effective. 9
When the preference for general legacies is coupled with the English
Wills Act, the result is that the court begins its analysis with a presumption
that the increased shares will not go to the named legatee. However, in
almost all cases the court arrives at a result that is contrary to this initial
5. Wills Act of 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 24. Most states, including
Missouri, do not have such legislation and do not go so far. See Lansdale v.
Dearing, 351 Mo. 356, 363, 173 S.W.2d 25, 29 (1943), quoting Long v. Weir, 2
Rich. Eq. 283, 46 Am. Dec. 51 (S.C. Ct. Err. & App. 1846):
This is true [that a will speaks with reference to the time of death of the
testator], as to its legal effect-it can only operate upon things as they
then exist; but in arriving at the intention, regard must be had to the
state of things existing at the time of execution of the will.
6. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Emrie, 347 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Mo.
1961).7. Id. a 201.
8. For cases discussing the rationale for making the classification of the
legacy determinative, see Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 744, 232 A.2d 789,
792 (1967); Warner v. Baylor, 204 Va. 867, 873, 134, S.E.2d 263, 269 (1964).
9. Allen v. National Bank, 19 Ill. App. 2d 149, 156, 153 N.E.2d 260, 263
(1958); 57 AM. JuR. Wills § 1406 (1948).
The reason for the preference fails in cases involving stock splits when the
testator retains all the stock until death. For Missouri cases recognizing the
preference, see Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Emrie, 347 S.W.2d 198,
201 (Mo. 1961); Adams v. Conqueror Trust Co., 358 Mo. 763, 771, 217 S.W.2d
476, 479 (1949); Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hovey, 319 Mo. 192, 204, 5
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presumption.10 In effect, the courts have created an inappropriate presump-
tion which must be overcome in order to reach the desired result.
The cardinal rule of will construction is that the intention of the
testator must always govern.". Though the Missouri Supreme Court has
frequently invoked this rule in stock split cases, the correct application
of the rule is still unclear. In Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children v.
Emrie,12 the Missouri Supreme Court suggested that the proper approach
is first to determine the testator's intention as to the desired beneficiary,
and then to classify the legacy as general or specific to fit that intention:
In this case a determination of the intention of the testatrix... as
to whether the legatees named in the third and fourth clauses of
the will are to receive the equivalent of the stated number of shares
of stock with a par value of $25, or only the stated number of
shares of stock with a par value of $5, will result in a determina-
tion of whether the testatrix intended the bequest to be specific or
general.13
However, in In re Estate of Leonard,'4 the Missouri court seemed to take
the opposite approach when it said: "[Finding the intention of the
testatrix necessarily calls for a determination of whether or not she intended
to make a specific bequest."" 5 This language suggests that the court was
seeking to determine whether the testator intended a specific or a general
legacy, and that the disposition of the stock followed mechanically from
this determination.
Thus, it is unclear which intention the Missouri court is currently
seeking. Both the Leonard and Shriners Hospital cases failed to discuss
the issue. However, in the Shriners Hospital case, the court, after espousing
the above view, proceeded to ignore that view by analyzing the will in the
conventional, mechanical manner of scouring the will for some indicia of in-
10. All Missouri appellate decisions in stock split and related cases have
held the bequests to be specific, notwithstanding the preference to the contrary.
See In re Estate of Leonard, 467 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1971); Shriners Hosp. for
Crippled Children v. Emrie, 347 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. 1961); Adams v. Conqueror
Trust Co., 358 Mo. 763, 217 S.W.2d 476 (1949); Robert v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
324 Mo. 314, 23 S.W.2d 32 (1929) (a stock dividend case); Hayes v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91 (1927) (a stock dividend case).
The same result is usually reached in other jurisdictions. See In re Helfman's
Estate, 193 Cal. App. 2d 652, 656, 14 Cal. Rptr. 482, 485 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 276, 278 (1949).
11. Section 474.430, RSMo 1969 provides: "All courts . .. shall have due
regard to the directions of the will, and the true intent and meaning of the
testator, in all matters brought before them." This statutory language seems to
imply that the subjective intent of the testator prevails over the intention mani-
fested by the language of the will, if the two are in conflict. But see Gardner v.
Vanlandingham, 334 Mo. 1054, 1061, 69 S.W.2d 947, 950 (1934). Cf. Tucker v.
Seaman's Aid Society, 7 Met. (48 Mass.) 188 (1843); Seltzer v. Schroeder, 409
S.W.2d 777 (K.G. Mo. App. 1966), noted in McLarney, Exercise of a Power of
Appointment Without Mention of the Power, 33 Mo. L. REV. 126 (1968); In re
Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank, 418 Pa. 112, 115, 208 A.2d 857, 859 (1965).
12. 347 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. 1961).
13. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
14. 467 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. 1971).
15. Id. at 88.
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tention to give a specific legacy. Thus, the Shriners Hospital view seemed to
be rejected in the same case in which it was proposed. The Leonard case
adds little clarity to the above contradiction. In it the court relied heavily
upon the Shriners Hospital case and two other cases that did not involve
stock splits.10
The approach of the Leonard case, that the classification of the legacy
is determinative, produces a bad result for the named legatee in the situa-
tion where the testator sells the stock either before or after a stock split.' 7
If the legacy is classified as specific, it is adeemed by the sale, and the
named legatee receives nothing.'s If, on the other hand, the legacy is said
to be general, the named legatee receives a monetary equivalent equal to
the value of the number of shares specified in the will, even though this
value has been depreciated by the stock split.' 9 In such a situation, in order
to reach a result consistent with previous Missouri decisions, which have
distributed the increased shares resulting from a stock split to the named
legatee, it will be necessary for the courts to reject the idea that the classifi-
cation of the legacy is determinative.
Since under the Leonard approach classification of the legacy is still
very important, a look at how courts find legacies to be specific will
be useful to attorneys. To hold that a legacy of stock is specific, the court
must find a "word or circumstance sufficiently designating and separating
[the shares of stock] . . . to show that a bequest of them was intended
to be specific." 2 0 The use of possessory words in describing the stock is
usually sufficient to so designate the shares as particular shares belonging
to the testator at the time of his death.2' Similarly, if the testator specifies
the location of the stock22 or gives stock in a closed corporation, 23 the
legacy is usually specific.
The number of shares bequeathed may indicate an intention to create
a specific legacy. If the number of shares bequeathed matches the number
owned by the testator at the time of execution, the court may infer that
16. Id; see Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hovey, 319 Mo. 192, 5 S.W.2d437 (1927); In re Calnane's Estate, 28 S.W.2d 420 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
17. Only two cases of this type could be found: In re Fitch's Will, 281 App.Div. 65, 118 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1952); In re Roob's Estate, 59 Misc. 2d 619, N.Y.S.2d
9 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
18. See text accompanying note 9 supra. Although subject to ademption by
extinction or change in form, a specific bequest has the advantage, if not adeemed,
of priority over general legacies for the purpose of abatement. § 473.620, RSMo
1969.
19. Most courts agree that a general legacy of stock must be satisfied, either
by purchase and delivery of the stock or by a cash equivalent payment, even if
the stock is not in the estate at the time of the testator's death. See Annot., 22
A.L.R.2d 457 (1952), for a collection of cases on this point.
20. In re Bernheimer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 106, 176 S.W.2d 15, 20 (1943).
21. In In re Largue's Estate, 267 Mo. 104, 113, 183 S.W. 608, 610 (1916), the
court stated: "It is practically conceded . . . that if the will in controversy had
said 'my stock' or 'the stock which I own' ... the legacies ... would have been
specific."
22. See Ruh's Ex'r v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W.2d 1097 (Ct. App. 1937).
23. See In re Comiskey's Estate, 24 Ill. App. 2d 199, 203, 164 N.E.2d 535,538 (1960); In re Kingsley's Will, 67 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470 (Sur. Ct. 1946).
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the shares intended to be given were the ones then in his possession. 24
Stretching this inference to its limit, the Missouri Supreme Court has said
that when a testator "'owns sufficient stock... [when he makes the will]
to satisfy the bequest he undoubtedly intends to give the shares in his
possession .... , "25 The above inference seems to be even stronger if the
specified number of shares is an odd lot2 6 or a fractional number.27
Association with other specific legacies may color a legacy with
specificity. Courts have said that there is "a presumption that the testator
intended a gift to be specific when that gift is closely associated in the
will with other gifts that are clearly specific to the same legatee. ' '28 The
juxtaposition of a pecuniary bequest and a bequest of stock may also indi-
cate a specific legacy.29 The chameleon effect of association with other
legacies does not always apply, because it has been suggested that a gift
of stock among general legacies is even more likely to be specific because
of the contrast.3 0
Instructions in the will to the executor may reveal an intention to
treat the bequest of stock as specific. An order to hold the stock in trust
tends to separate the stock from the rest of the estate, and this separation
tends to make the legacy specific. 3' In Adams v. Conqueror Trust Co.,3 2
the court thought that a direction to the trustee of a testamentary trust not
to invest in any corporate common stock tended to make legacies of stock
to the trustee specific. The court reasoned that if the stock owned by the
testator when the will was executed was sold by him the bequest of it
would necessarily be adeemed because the trustee could not purchase
replacement stock. Ademption of a legacy not in the estate at the time
of death is a characteristic of a specific legacy, and, therefore, the legacy
was specific.33
24. Igoe v. Darby, 177 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. 1961); In re Calnane's Estate, 28
S.W.2d 420, 422 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930). Contra, In re Kirkwoods Estate, 31 Ohio
Op. 2d 205, 207 N.E.2d 587 (P. Ct. 1965).
25. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Emrie, 347 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Mo.
1961), quoting Paulus, Special and General Legacies of Securities, 43 IowA L. REv.
422 (1958).
26. See In re Calnane's Estate, 28 S.W.2d 420, 422 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
27. See Paulus, supra note 25, at 471.
28. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Emrie, 347 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Mo.
1961); accord, In re Leonard's Estate, 467 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Mo. 1971).
29. See Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., v. Hovey, 319 Mo. 192, 211, 5
S.W.2d 437, 446 (1928); In re Calnane's Estate, 28 S.W.2d 420, 422 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1930).
30. Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hovey, 319 Mo. 192, 211, 5 S.W.2d
437, 446 (Mo. 1928).
31. See Adams v. Conqueror Trust Co., 358 Mo. 763, 771, 217 S.W.2d 476,
479 (1949); In re Berheimer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 106, 176 S.W.2d 15, 20 (1943);
Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hovey, 319 Mo. 192, 211, 5 S.W.2d 437, 446
(Mo. 1928); In re Largue's Estate, 267 Mo. 104, 114, 183 S.W. 608, 610 (1916);
In re Bartlett's Will, 13 App. Div. 2d 1028, 217 N.Y.S.2d 451, modified, 218
N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1961).
32. 358 Mo. 763, 217 S.W.2d 476 (1949).
33. Id. at 771, 217 S.W.2d at 480. The bequest in this case was residuary
and did not mention stock at all. The stock was mentioned only in the form
of a direction to the trustee to distribute stock at the termination of a trust for
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The use of extrinsic evidence as an aid in finding the testator's intent
depends on the intention for which the court is looking.34 If the issue
to which the evidence goes is whether the testator intended to create a
specific or a general legacy (as suggested by the Leonard case),3 5 the scope
of the evidence is limited to facts that tend to show that the testator in-
tended to give particular shares in his possession at the time the will was
executed. Evidence which has been admitted in Missouri includes the acts
of the testator when he made his will3 0 and the number of shares owned
by the testator at the time he executed the will.3 7 Missouri courts have
made no further use of extrinsic evidence in stock split cases. If the issue
is the determination of the testator's intended beneficiary of the increased
shares (as suggested by the Shriners Hospital case),38 extrinsic evidence
should be admissible to the same extent that it is in other will construc-
tion situations.30 This includes evidence that shows the testator's relations
with his beneficiaries and the financial circumstances of the beneficiaries. 40
The Missouri courts have consistently given the increment from a
stock split to the named legatee. 41 This result is embraced by the vast
majority of jurisdictions,42 but many courts have disapproved of the
rationale that makes the classification of the legacy determinative. Several
courts have expressly stated that classification of the legacy in cases in-
volving stock splits is unnecessary. 43 The rule of construction that is
emerging from these cases is "that in the absence of an intention to the
34. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3rd 432 (1967), for a discussion on the use of ex-
trinsic evidence to classify a legacy of stock. For a discussion of Missouri law, see
Schubel v. Bonacker, 331 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1960).
35. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
36. In re Calnane's Estate, 28 S.W.2d 420, 422 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930). For
cases in other jurisdictions, see Savings Inv. & Trust Co. v. Crouch, 93 N.J. Eq.
311, 313, 116 A. 696, 697 (Ct. Err. & App.), affd, 118 A. 927 (1922); In re Van
Vliet, 5 Misc. 169, 170, 25 N.Y.S. 722 (Sur. Ct. 1893).
37. See text accompanying note 25 supra. However, sometimes a bequest is
ecific even though it does not relate to property owned by the testator on the
ate of execution. For example, a bequest of "any stock in drug companies owned
by me at the time of my death" would be specific. See note 4 supra.
38. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
39. The general rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible, if the language
of the will is ambiguous, to show the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will. Lang v. Estorage, 242 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1951).
40. Obetz v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 361 Mo. 221, 234 S.W.2d 618 (1950);
Wooley v. Hayes, 285 Mo. 566, 226 S.WAr. 842 (1920). Types of evidence inad-
missible in Missouri are declarations of the testator, Winkel v. Streicher, 295
S.W.2d 56, 58 (Mo. En Banc 1956), and testimony of the scrivener as to what the
testator told him, Andre v. Andre, 288 Mo. 271, 279, 232 S.W. 153, 158 (Mo. 1921).
41. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
42. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 276, 278 (1949).
43. In re Helfman's Estate, 193 Cal. App. 2d 652, 14 Cal. Rptr. 482 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961); In re Parker's Estate, 110 So. 2d 498 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959); Allen
v. Nat'l Bank, 19 11. App. 149, 153 N.E.2d 260 (1958); In re Harvey's Estate,
272 A.2d 603 (N.H. 1970); In re Fitch's Will, 281 App. Div. 65, 118 N.Y.S.2d 234
(1952); In re McFerren's Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950); Egavian v.
Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 232 A.2d 789 (1967); see In re Doonan's Estate, 262 A.2d
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contrary, a legatee of stock is entitled to additional shares issued as a
result of a stock split occurring after the execution of the will."44 The
reasonableness and simplicity of this approach is very appealing. It is
apparent that, in bequeathing stock, testators generally intend to give a
proportionate part of a corporation's assets, and the specification of a
number of shares is a convenient method of quantifying that portion.
Unilateral action on the part of the corporation in issuing new stock does
not warrant the conclusion that the testator has changed his intention.
The concept of specific and general legacies appears to be superfluous
when a stock split is involved. An intention to bequeath particular shares
of stock in the testator's possession does not seem probative of an inten-
tion as to who should receive the increased shares resulting from a stock
split. 45
Missouri courts are in a position to progress toward this modem trend
without any major departure from past case law. The Shriners Hospital
case suggested that classification of the legacy is merely an afterthought
and that the determinative issue is who the testator intended to receive
the increase resulting from the stock split.46 The court could use the
language in the Shriners Hospital case as a first step toward rejecting the
distinction between specific and general legacies in cases involving stock
splits. This approach would not be likely to change the result of many
decisions; it would, however, streamline the process of legal reasoning
by eliminating the task of classifying the legacy.
CHARLES E. BucHiAN
44. Allen v. Nat'l Bank, 19 Ill. App. 2d 149, 160, 153 N.E.2d 260, 265 (1958).
The First Tentative Draft of Revised Part IL MODEL PROBATE CODE § 250 (1966),
provided:
A change, by a stock split or like device, in the proportional interest in a
corporation represented by a share of its stock, entitles a devisee of a
specified number of shares to so many shares as are needed to represent
the same proportional interest in the corporation as the specified number
represented when the will was executed, whether the devise is specific,
general or demonstrative.
Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1037, 1087
(1966). This draft section was superseded by UNMFOi PROBATE CODE § 2-607 (1969).
See note 3 supra.
45. In Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 746, 232 A.2d 789, 794 (1967), the
court stated:
It would give undue credence to pure fiction to hold that a testator's
true intent as to whether a legatee should receive the increased . . .
shares... could be determined from the degree of specificity with which
the bequest was drafted ....
46. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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WITNESSES-WAIVER OF INCOMPETENCY
BY SUBMISSION OF INTERROGATORIES
In re L-'
A married mother brought this action for a declaratory judgment that
the defendant, who was not the plaintiff's husband, was her child's father.
Plaintiff also requested an order for the child's support. Before trial the
defendant served the plaintiff with several interrogatories, including one
which asked if plaintiff was living with her husband during the period
of conception. The plaintiff answered that she occupied the same house-
hold but did not share the same bed for any purpose.2 The defendant then
moved for summary judgment, using plaintiff's answers to the inter-
rogatories in support of the motion. Defendant asserted that the plaintiff
could not rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock
because she had admitted that her husband had access to her. Plaintiff
filed an affidavit stating that, among other items, she had sexual inter-
course with no other man except the defendant during the appropriate
time period. On these facts the trial court entered a summary judgment
for the defendant.3
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding there was a
genuine issue of material fact which precluded summary judgment.4 The
court stated that proof of adultery coupled with other evidence showing
nonaccess to the spouse would rebut the presumption of legitimacy. The
court further stated that plaintiff would be competent to furnish this
proof of nonaccess by her testimony in court. The court said that although
Missouri follows the rule that
neither spouse may testify to nonaccess between the two when the
legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is in issue .... [p]laintiff's
competency to testify to nonaccess was waived here since the de-
fendant served interrogatories and received answers thereto. . ..
In support of this proposition the court cited Watkins v. Watkins.0 Al-
though Watkins involved waiver of incompetency under the Missouri
Deadman Statute,7 the court considered it authority on the question of
competency of a spouse to testify to nonaccess.8
Most jurisdictions follow one of two general rules as to whether the
serving of interrogatories or the taking of depositions constitutes a waiver
of a witness' incompetency to testify. The position that the Missouri court
took in this case-that the serving of interrogatories or taking of depositions
constitutes a waiver of a witness' incompetency to testify-is consistent with
previous decisions. Since Ess v. Griffith,9 Missouri has adhered to the so-
1. 461 S.W.2d 529 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
2. Id. at 530.
3. Id. at 531.
4. Id. at 534.
5. Id.
6. 397 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1965).
7. § 491.010, RSMo 1969.
8. See In re L-,461 S.W.2d 529, 584 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970).
9. 139 Mo. 322, 40 S.W. 930 (1897).
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called older view that it is unfair to permit "fishing expeditions." Thus,
taking a deposition or serving interrogatories is considered to be the same
as calling a witness, and waives the incompetency.
The jurisdictions, such as Missouri, that follow this rule of waiver
begin with the assumption that permitting discovery without waiving
incompetency is basically unfair because it permits a party to ascertain
by examination what a person will say, and then admit or exclude that
person's testimony at the party's pleasure.' 0 Taking the view that "[nio
fair distinction can be made between a waiver implied from an examina-
tion of an incompetent witness on the trial and that from taking his
deposition before the trial,"'" these jurisdictions hold that the incompetency
of a spouse to testify can be waived under the same general rules which
provide for waiver upon the calling of any incompetent witness. Although
some jurisdictions that follow the older rule require the answers to be
filed with the court before the waiver is effective, 12 Missouri does not.18
The more recent trend is to hold that there is no waiver of incompe-
tency unless the deposition or answers to the interrogatories are introduced
into evidence.14 This generally reflects the liberalization of pre-trial dis-
covery procedures, particularly under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.' 5 This rule of nonwaiver is followed in the federal courts and in
most jurisdictions whose rules of court are patterned after the federal
rules. It is viewed as a rule of procedure in federal courts. Thus, in cases
in federal court, the law of the state where the court is situated determines
the competency of the witness, but the federal rules are controlling as
to whether there is a waiver of incompetency by discovery. For example,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case of Duling v. Markun'6 involved
an alleged waiver of incompetency under the Indiana Deadman Statute.
Under Indiana law, the taking of a deposition of a person incompetent
to testify constitutes a waiver of the incompetency. However, the deposi-
tion in this case was taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which allow such discovery without waiver. The court held, there-
10. Stewart v. Hood, 10 Ala. 600 (1846) (later overruled); Ess v. Griffith, 139
Mo. 322, 40 S.W. 930 (1897).
In Ess, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that a party, after discovery, can
not in fairness make the decision whether he wishes to make the witness competent
or not. Id. at 331, 40 S.W. at 931.
These jurisdictions feel that it would be unjust for one party to force his
adversary to disclose matters of defense under oath and deny him the right to
explain further the circumstances of the transactions thus disclosed. See, e.g., Smith
v. Clark, 219 Ark. 751, 244 S.W.2d 776 (1952).
11. Ess v. Griffith, 139 Mo. 322, 330, 40 S.W. 930, 931 (1897). See also
Colder v. Golder, 102 Kan. 486, 170 P. 803 (1918).
12. Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969).
13. See P.M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v. Glencoe Lime &c Cement Co., 187 S.W.
807 (St. L. Mo. App. 1916), in which the court stated: "It was immaterial that the
deposition was never transcribed and filed." Id. at 811.
14. Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 389 (1969).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32 (c). Most of the cases were decided under old rule
26 (f), which used the same words now in 32 (c): "A person shall not be deemed to
make a person his own witness for any purpose by taking his deposition."
16. 231 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1956).
1972]
49
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
fore, that the taking of the deposition did not constitute a waiver of the
incompetency. 17
The main argument against waiver of incompetency by discovery
is that it is unfair to force a party to choose between losing his rights under
a rule of incompetency, or losing his right to make use of all possible
discovery procedures. This modern view, followed in the federal courts,
appears to be the better approach when the purpose of discovery is con-
sidered. Discovery procedure is now designed to permit exploration and
avoid surprise at trial.18 The jurisdictions allowing discovery without
waiver feel that one should not be penalized for the mere acquisition of
information for the purpose of bringing the truth to court.' 9 The real
purpose of interrogatories is to aid in the pleading and preparation of a
case. They are an economical means of discovery, and their use as evidence
is only incidental to this primary purpose.20 A deposition or interrogatory
not offered as evidence is not evidentiary support for a trial judge's decision,
it is not part of the record on appeal, and there is no reason to hold that
the opposing party is prejudiced by its use to obtain pre-trial information.2 '
It has been said that permitting the gaining of information that may later
be objected to is a sacrifice which must be made in order to protect the
overall freedom of discovery that should be allowed. 22
In In re L-, the court's application of the same rule used to deter-
mine waiver of incompetency under the deadman statute to the deter-
mination of waiver of incompetency to testify as to nonaccess was consistent
with prior Missouri cases. To determine whether this is a logical and sound
approach, it is necessary to examine the history and theory behind each
type of incompetency.
The rule that a spouse could not testify to nonaccess was first ad-
vanced by Lord Mansfield. The basic rationale Mansfield stated for this
rule was that to allow a child to be declared illegitimate on the basis of
such testimony would contravene accepted standards of decency and
morality.23 Although this rule has since been reversed by statute in England,
it is generally followed in this country.24 In addition to the reasons stated
by Mansfield,26 American courts have advanced three public policy reasons
for adhering to this rule that a spouse is incompetent to testify as to
nonaccess: First, it is stated that the rule lessens the number of public
charges to be cared for and supported by the public; second, it promotes
the peace and quiet of the family; and third, it benefits the peace of the
community and society generally. 26 However, the seemingly best and most
17. Id. at 839.
18. Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953); Pink v. Dempsey,
350 111. App. 405, 113 N.E.2d 334 (1953).
19. See, e.g., McGugart v. Brumback, 77 Wash. 2d 441, 463 P.2d 140 (1969).
20. Slover v. Harris, 77 Wyo. 295, 314 P.2d 953 (1957).
21. Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. 1953).
22. Stewart v. Brandenburg, 383 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
23. Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 594, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777).
24. C. McCoRMicK, LAw oF EVIDENCE § 67 (1954).
25. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527 (1908).
26. In re Wright's Estate, 237 Mich. 375, 381, 211 N.W. 746, 749 (1927).
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acceptable purpose of the nonaccess rule is that it benefits the child by
making it more difficult to declare him illegitimate.27
The basic purpose of a deadman statute is quite different. Its purpose
is not to benefit some third person, but, rather, to benefit the party
opponent by keeping the parties equal during the lawsuit. The reasons
for preventing the living party from obtaining such an advantage are said
to be to prevent fraud and to protect the estate of deceased persons. 28
If the opponent takes the deposition of, or serves interogatories on, the
living person, the parties are no longer considered equal. Thus, the living
party is allowed to restore the equality.29 However, it has been stated that
these reasons have been used as excuses to permit waiver in many cases
because of judicial dissatisfaction with the deadman statute.3 0
Since the purposes and theories behind the nonaccess rule (to benefit
someone other than a party to the lawsuit) and the deadman statute (to
maintain equality) differ, it is questionable whether either type of case
affords good authority for the other on the question of waiver of the
incompetency rule. This is particularly true when it is considered that
courts often find a waiver of the deadman statute because of their general
dissatisfaction with the theory behind it. A better approach for the courts
to take would be to determine whether or not a rule of waiver by sub-
mission of interrogatories is consistent with the policy considerations behind
the particular type of incompetency.
In making this determination, two questions should be considered
by the court in relation to waiver of incompetency to testify as to non-
access because of submission of interrogatories. First, should there be one
simple rule covering all types of incompetency, or should there be a dif-
ferent rule for each? As previously noted, most of the jurisdictions use
one of the two general rules, but the better approach would be to formulate
a rule of waiver consistent with the policy behind each type of incompe-
tency. Missouri does deviate from its general rule in one particular type
of deadman statute case, so it would not be a complete departure from
practice to have waiver depend on the type of incompetency. 31
Secondly, if the waiver rule is to be based on the theory of each par-
ticular type of incompetency, is any waiver consistent with the nonaccess
rule? There are valid policy arguments on both sides of the question.
One argument favoring waiver is simply the general dissatisfaction with
the incompetency rule itself by those who believe that the interests of
society are best protected by admitting all relevant evidence. 32 Moreover,
the incompetency rule does not necessarily prevent bastardization of a
27. Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 A. 318 (1938).
28. Banaszkiewicz v. Baun, 359 Mich. 109, 101 N.W.2d 306 (1960).
29. Ess v. Griffith, 139 Mo. 322, 40 S.W. 930 (1897).
30. McGugart v. Brumback, 77 Wash. 2d 441, 463 P.2d 140 (1969).
31. In Missouri, interrogatories filed in probate court for the purpose of dis-
covering assets constitute the pleadings and do not waive incompetency under the
Missouri Deadman Statute. See, e.g., Estate of Rogers v. Courier, 429 S.W.2d 258(Mo. 1968).
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child because nonaccess may be established by other competent evidence.8 3
On the other hand, there is a good argument for allowing discovery without
waiver. Discovery is particularly needed in this situation because the in-
competence of the witness is only partial. That is, not all the testimony
of the witness is barred, nor is a question about access always barred,
since the witness may testify that there was access to her spouse during
the period in question. Because only a negative answer to the question
is barred, the opposing attorney will not know there is a competency
problem until he receives the answer to his interrogatory. The attorney
should not be penalized by the loss of the benefit of the incompetency rule,
when the application of that rule could not have been known to him until
after he asked the question which caused the waiver.
As discussed previously, the courts should first consider the policy
behind the type of incompetency at issue in the case before them. Then
they should formulate a waiver rule that best carries out the policy of
that type of incompetency. In the nonaccess situation, considering its pur-
pose of benefiting the child, the better rule would be to allow discovery
without waiving the incompetency of the witness. This is particularly true
considering the purpose of discovery as an aid in preparing the case. This
is especially true in this area where the attorney needs to use interrogatories
to discover that a competency problem even exists.
JOHN P- HOPKNS
33. Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937); State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Flynn, 180 Wis. 556, 193 N.W. 651 (1923).
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